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ABSTRACT
The head of the Veterans Administration resigned in 2014 when 
problems in VA hospitals came to light. At the time, many members 
of Congress expressed shock at the depth of VA mismanagement and 
duplicity. This Article argues that important information about VA—
and other agency—performance can be gleaned from the hundreds 
of lawsuits filed each year against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act but are dismissed for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Dismissed FTCA suits potentially signal agency 
practices that warrant review and reform, but these decisions have 
extremely low salience, and a jurisdictional dismissal often is 
conflated with a merits determination that misconduct did not occur. 
This Article recommends various mechanisms that Congress and 
third-party overseers should use in order to investigate and follow-
up on cases that are dismissed under the FTCA, cases that run the 
gamut from medical malpractice at the VA to sexual abuse in the 
military. The proposal is allied with “new governance” theories and 
their emphasis on learning and dynamic feedback as a basis for 
policy formation. The proposal also builds on theoretical 
commentary treating litigation as a public good that generates 
information critical to sound policy making. And the argument takes 
account of principal–agent problems and acknowledges when a 
third-party overseer might be preferred in place of Congress to 
undertake the investigation that is suggested. At a time when many 
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commentators question whether tort remedies meaningfully deter 
public wrong doing, the proposal seeks to encourage greater 
accountability through information exchange and oversight.  
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INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the head of the Veterans Administration (VA) 
resigned from office amidst a scandal that VA hospitals had created 
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false patient records to hide scheduling delays in veterans’ medical 
care.1 In response, Congress and the President worked with unusual 
bipartisan energy to pass the Veterans Access, Choice, and 
Accountability Act of 2014, with an estimated price tag of $18 
billion, revamping service delivery and allowing officials to be fired 
for poor performance.2 Like Captain Renault in the movie 
Casablanca, politicians expressed shock at the depth of VA 
mismanagement and its managers’ rank duplicity.3 Lawmakers easily 
could have known about substandard practices at the VA—and even 
attempted to undertake reform—had they been more attentive to their 
constituents’ lawsuits under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
the statute that waives the immunity of the United States and subjects 
it to suit in federal court for various tortious acts by its agents.4
Successful FTCA claims identify clear instances of agency 
negligence;5 claims that are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds 
potentially reveal even deeper breakdowns in agency practice. 
Unfortunately, dismissed FTCA suits remain an unmined source of 
information for most policy makers. Admittedly, allegations in a 
federal-tort complaint, or any complaint, are by design one-sided and 
                                                     
1. Greg Jaffe & Ed O’Keefe, Obama Accepts Resignation of VA Secretary 
Shinseki, WASH. POST (May 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
shinseki-apologizes-for-va-health-care-scandal/2014/05/30/e605885a-e7f0-1.
2. Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-146, 128 Stat. 1754 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (2014)); see 
also Joe Davidson, New VA Law Tackles Agency Problems, but Also Hurts 
Employee Rights, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/federal-eye/wp/2014/08/07/new-va-law-tackles-agency-problems-but-also-
hurts-employee-rights/ (summarizing the law and observing it includes “the 
gratuitous and punitive hit on the civil service rights of . . . members in the 
department”); David Hawkings, Veteran Voices, Influence Fade on the Hill, ROLL 
CALL (June 2, 2014, 3:53 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/hawkings/veterans-affairs-
scandal-congress-few-vets-on-hill/ (stating that the proposed comprehensive VA 
health bill “would cost at least $18 billion during the next five years”).
3. See Lesatseaside, Casablanca Gambling? I’m Shocked!, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 18, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjbPi00k_ME. 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); §§ 2671-2680 (2012). 
5. The General Accounting Office’s review of VA paid tort claims—
undertaken in 2011 at special request of the Senate and House Committees on 
Veterans Affairs—suggested not only a pattern of substandard service delivery in 
veteran hospitals, but also a failure to transmit information about the problem within 
the agency so that reforms could be undertaken. See RANDALL B. WILLIAMSON, U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-6R, VA HEALTH CARE: VA USES 
MEDICAL INJURY TORT CLAIMS DATA TO ASSESS VETERANS’ CARE, BUT SHOULD 
TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THESE DATA ARE COMPLETE 3, 14 (2011), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585978.pdf. 
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have not yet been tested through discovery or trial. Some FTCA 
claims may even sound “kooky” or conspiratorial: Consider a 
complaint alleging that the VA altered the plaintiff–veteran’s 
medical records,6 or that the VA set up “mythical [f]ile numbers” 
resulting in the denial of compensation benefits to the plaintiff–
veteran.7 Such claims may seem as presumptively implausible as 
those “about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto”8
that a court would reject as a matter of “judicial experience and 
common sense.”9 A year before the VA scandal came to light, a 
district court in Ohio dismissed with prejudice a veteran’s claim that 
the VA unjustifiably had delayed processing his benefits.10 Plaintiff, 
pro se and suffering from mental health problems, wrote much of the 
complaint in large capital letters; the court characterized the pleading 
as “delusional,” “frivolous,” and “rambling.”11 Yet as recent 
headlines show, truth is sometimes stranger than even the most 
fantastic pleading.12 For all of their biases and defects, federal-tort 
claims that are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may signal agency 
problems, which—if timely investigated—could prevent 
administrative catastrophe and individual hardship.  
The approaching seventieth anniversary of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act marks an occasion to think about the statute and to 
consider whether its strategy of legalizing constraints on 
                                                     
6. Deloria v. Veterans Admin., 927 F.2d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies a claim of a veteran 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder “that VA employees conspired to 
deprive him of his benefits by altering his medical records”).
7. Verner v. U.S. Gov’t, 804 F. Supp. 381, 383-84 (D.D.C. 1992) (alleging 
that staff in Waco, Texas altered records in order to deny benefits to the plaintiff). 
8. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
9. Id. at 679 (majority opinion).  
10. See Bush v. United States, No. 1:13-CV-587, 2013 WL 5722802, at *7 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2013). 
11. Id. at *1, *5-6.  
12. Cf. VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., 13-
03699-209, REVIEW OF THE SPECIAL INITIATIVE TO PROCESS RATING CLAIMS PENDING 
OVER 2 YEARS 2 (2014), available at http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-13-
03699-209.pdf (“[The Veteran Benefits Administration] removed provisionally-
related claims from the pending inventory although additional work was needed to 
finalize these claims. This process ultimately misrepresented VBA’s actual 
workload of pending claims and the progress toward eliminating the overall claims 
backlog.”). The report states that staff in the Waco, Texas VA office “reported they 
felt pressured to make final or provisional decisions without all of the necessary 
evidence in order to close the claims.” Id. at 12. Processing manipulation variously 
resulted in the overpayment and the underpayment of claims depending on the 
individual claimant’s medical and financial situation. See id. at 14. 
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governmental action has improved public accountability.13 Called 
“the most sweeping waiver ever made of the traditional immunity of 
the sovereign,”14 the FTCA confers jurisdiction on the federal courts 
to enter money judgments against the United States for injuries 
negligently caused by its agents. Congress intended the statute to 
provide injured parties with “easy and simple” access to the federal 
courts for torts within its scope,15 thereby relieving itself of two 
burdens: investigating the thousands of tort claims submitted to it 
each year for payment16 and enacting legislation for any claimant 
Congress chose to compensate.17 Instead of the often criticized 
                                                     
13. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812, 842,
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), §§ 2671-2680 (2012)); see Herbert R. 
Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort: A Review of the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
Reported Decisions to Date, 26 N.C. L. REV. 119, 120-21 (1948) (referring to the 
statute’s enactment date as when “governmental non-liability for tort was really 
doomed”).
  The topic is timely for another reason. The Supreme Court of the United 
States has granted certiorari in a pair of FTCA cases concerning the availability of 
equitable tolling of the time periods to file administrative claims and to file federal 
lawsuits. See June v. United States, 550 F. App’x 505 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2873 (2014); Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted 
sub nom. United States v. Wong, 134 S. Ct. 2873 (2014). The author’s position is 
that the time periods are classic claims-processing provisions and not jurisdictional, 
so equitable tolling ought to be available. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 130, 137-38 (2008). However, this Article does not primarily 
address the question that the Court has accepted for certiorari; whatever the Court’s 
disposition, the reforms I suggest remain necessary. Late filings sometimes are due 
to claimant error, especially when the claimant appears pro se. But the late filing 
also could be due to agency error, as for example, when an agency employee 
neglects to give the claimant important information about the dispute-resolution 
process or fails to provide a necessary form. The situations embedded in these cases 
may reveal agency lapses or administrative policies that require structural revision in 
addition to any judicially ordered relief for the individual claimant. Agency 
problems are not solved simply by characterizing them as jurisdictional and so 
outside the judiciary’s power to redress. 
14. Robert E. Lewis, Litigation Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 TEX.
L. REV. 807, 807 (1949).  
15. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953). 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963) (reporting 
that from the sixty-eighth through the seventy-eighth Congresses, 2,000 private bills 
were introduced seeking compensation for tortious injury by agents of the federal 
government; 20% were enacted); see also Roscoe Pound, The Tort Claims Act: 
Reason or History?, 486 INS. L.J. 402, 404 (1963) (“It came to be settled 
practice . . . for injured individuals to apply to the legislature for relief by a special 
Act.”). 
17. See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the 
Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 323-26 (1942) (describing 
the congressional procedure for handling private bills).  
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private-bill system18—aspects of which are depicted in the popular 
movies The Godfather and American Hustle19—Congress consented 
to pay damages if adjudged liable under “the law of the place,” the 
state law that would govern liability if a private person were sued 
under the same circumstances as the United States.20
Unlike a constitutional tort action—so-called Bivens liability—
an FTCA judgment runs against the United States, which litigates in 
place of an individual officer and is formally substituted as a party.21
                                                     
18. Justice Frankfurter referred to the “caprice and legislative burden of 
individual private laws.” Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 
(1955); Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-25 (calling the private-bill system “notoriously 
clumsy”); see also Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A 
Different Metaphor, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1107-09 (2009) 
(discussing the administrative burdens that persuaded Congress to transfer decision 
making over tort claims to the Article III courts). 
19. The Godfather includes a scene involving a father’s efforts to obtain a 
private bill conferring citizenship so his daughter can marry a man facing 
deportation to Italy. J. Geoff Malta, Mario Puzo’s The Godfather,
http://www.thegodfathertrilogy.com/gf1/transcript/gf1transcript.html (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2015) (relating the scene where Godfather Corleone instructs his consigliore 
to buy a “special bill” from a congressman—“[n]ot . . . our paisan. Give it to a Jew 
congressman, in another district”). American Hustle recounts the infamous 
“Abscam” investigation:
“I understand you can introduce legislation,” said DeVito, the 
conversation recorded and later played back before a federal jury.  
“Right, a bill. Private bill,” agreed Lederer. “Sure.”  
The congressman left the hotel with a brown bag containing $50,000 in 
cash. 
“Spend it well,” DeVito told him. 
Ted Sherman, Jersey Hustle: The Real-Life Story of Abscam, NJ.COM (Nov. 25, 
2013, 8:09 AM), http://www.nj.com/inside-jersey/index.ssf/2013/11/jersey_ 
hustle_the_real-life_story_of_abscam.html; see also Richard T. Boylan, Private 
Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying 1 (Jan. 15, 1998) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with New York University School of Law), 
available at http://128.118.178.162/eps/pe/papers/9801/9801002.pdf (discussing the 
scandals associated with private bills and modeling the idea that the introduction of 
a private bill increases the public’s perception of the sponsor as corrupt). 
20. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1) (2012). See generally Floyd D. Shimomura, The 
History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative 
Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625 (1985).  
21. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens
Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
809, 815 (2010) (contrasting the Bivens model with government liability under the 
FTCA).  
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A judgment under the statute thus carries a powerful message: It 
establishes that the federal government as an entity is responsible for 
plaintiff’s injuries because they were caused by official negligence. 
The history of the FTCA suggests that its legalization strategy—
converting political grievances presented to Congress into legal 
claims cognizable in court—has succeeded on its own terms;22 it 
provides compensation to litigants who prevail on the merits. In 
2006, the FTCA’s sixtieth year, the President’s budget assumed that 
judgments in federal-tort suits would total $477 million.23 Cases that 
are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds carry a more complicated 
message; the court has not yet reached the merits, so although the 
United States can claim a litigation victory, the question whether 
government negligence caused plaintiff’s injury remains unasked and 
unanswered.  
This Article argues that as with many efforts at legalization—
defined as subjecting public action to judicially enforced legal 
constraints—courts have tended toward a legalistic approach in their 
interpretation of the FTCA that undermines the statute’s 
effectiveness. Looking at the history of the FTCA, the trend ought 
not to be surprising. When it was enacted, commentary warned that 
procedural “snarls” might block valid statutory claims;24 1966 
amendments mandating administrative review as a threshold to suit 
elicited similar concerns.25 The “easy and simple” federal-court 
access that Congress substituted for the private-bill system is now 
complicated, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals has put it, by “a
                                                     
22. Figley, supra note 18, at 1138 (stating that “[t]he FTCA can be . . . 
understood as a drawbridge across the moat of sovereign immunity, providing a 
remedy for those claims that fit within the bounds of the drawbridge, comply with 
the procedures of the bridge keeper, and avoid the exceptions Congress built into the 
bridge”).
23. See STACY ANDERSON & BLAKE ROBERTS, HARVARD LAW SCH. FED.
BUDGET POLICY SEMINAR, CAPACITY TO COMMIT IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION:
TAKINGS, WINSTAR, FTCA, & THE COURT OF CLAIMS, Briefing Paper No. 12, at 28, 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/CapacitytoCommitt_ 
12.pdf. 
24. Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 540 (1947) 
(discussing aspects of the FTCA that “may entangle unwary claimants in intricate 
legal snarls”). But see McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (stating 
that because the statutory text is clear “it is certainly not a ‘trap for the unwary’”).
25. See 3 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 17.01 (Matthew 
Bender & Co. 2014) (1963) (setting out criticisms of and justifications for the 
administrative claim process).  
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barrier of technicalities;”26 even a meritorious FTCA claim may be 
dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds before the United 
States has answered the complaint and denied plaintiff’s factual 
allegations.27 In such cases the court side steps the question of 
government wrong, focusing instead on the claimant’s failure to 
follow a procedure that the government has attached to its waiver of 
sovereign immunity.28 Under these circumstances, the decision to 
dismiss the suit should not be taken as judicial absolution of the 
government’s alleged misconduct. Yet, as the theory of legalization 
predicts, legalism leads inexorably to “retreatism”—because the 
court has not found the challenged actions to be unlawful, the 
political branches decline to take responsibility even to investigate 
whether the alleged misconduct was in fact substandard and in need 
of revision.29 A court’s dismissal of the suit thus has unintended but 
negative spillover effects on political responsiveness, deflecting 
attention from possible agency misconduct that could require reform.
Karl N. Llewellyn famously stated, “For what substantive law 
says should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says 
that you can make real.”30 That procedural rules might be 
undermining the FTCA’s substantive goals creates a serious cost for 
individuals who are injured by the government’s negligence but 
whose claims are dismissed on what Justice Scalia might call “nit-
                                                     
26. Lopez v. United States, 758 F.2d 806, 809 (1st Cir. 1985). 
27. See 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3658, at 622 (3d ed. 1998) 
(“The plaintiff’s failure to follow each of the procedural prescriptions of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act can lead to very significant . . . litigation consequences.”). 
28. See Helen Hershkoff, Waivers of Immunity and Congress’s Power to 
Regulate Federal Jurisdiction—Federal-Tort Filing Periods as a Testing Case, 39 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. (forthcoming June 2015). 
29. See Jeffrey L. Jowell, Implementation and Enforcement of Law, in LAW 
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 287, 295 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986) 
(stating “[t]he essence of the defect of legalization lies in the tendency to legalism” 
and characterizing “retreatism” as an “avoidance of decisions, refusal to take 
responsibility for any definitive rule application, or cynical manipulation of the rules 
for the purely personal gain or convenience of the official”). Jowell drew from the 
idea of retreatism developed by Robert A. Kagan in his various writings about 
regulatory enforcement. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE:
IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE 94-96 (1978); see also Robert K. Merton, 
Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 672, 676 (1938) (coining the term 
retreatism as a form of deviance). 
30. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND 
ITS STUDY 8 (1930).  
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picking” grounds.31 But legalism also generates public costs apart 
from the individual misery involved. Social psychologists predict 
that a legal system’s use of unfair procedure erodes social trust and 
dilutes support for public institutions.32 This insight has particular 
relevance given the parties to an FTCA suit: ordinary people versus 
the United States. Court dismissals on procedural and jurisdictional 
grounds, often before discovery, may constrict access to information 
about agency practices, and for this reason can distort policy making 
by isolating lawmakers from problems that may need investigation 
and reform. Moreover, when courts treat injuries as not cognizable, 
                                                     
31. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 285 (2012) (“It is one thing to regard government 
liability as exceptional enough to require clarity of creation as a matter of presumed 
legislative intent. It is quite something else to presume that a legislature that has 
clearly made the determination that government liability is in the interest of justice 
wants to accompany that determination with nit-picking technicalities that would not 
accompany other causes of action.”); cf. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of 
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 127 (2011) (drawing “attention to the 
substantial costs imposed by heightened pleading standards on plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims”). As an example, consider a plaintiff who commences a 
personal-injury suit in state court, unaware—and indeed, reasonably unaware—that 
defendant is a federal employee, that the United States will substitute itself as a 
party, that the new defendant will remove the action from state to federal court, that 
a garden-variety state-tort action will be restyled as a federal-statutory-tort suit, and 
that eventually the federal action will be dismissed because plaintiff did not timely 
present the claim to a federal agency for investigation and possible settlement, and 
now the time to file the administrative claim has run, despite the fact that the state 
statute of limitations on the claim has not run and so a private individual, if sued, 
would be liable under state law for the injuries caused by the federal officer’s acts. 
See, e.g., Kelly v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. CIV.JFM-99-2433, 2000 WL 151280, 
at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2000), aff’d, 3 F. App’x 15 (4th Cir. 2001); Richard W. 
Bourne, A Day Late, a Dollar Short: Opening a Governmental Snare Which Tricks 
Poor Victims Out of Medical Malpractice Claims, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 87, 89-91
(2000) (discussing the problem). In other cases, government lawyers, relying on the 
statute’s use of the “law of the place” to determine liability, exacerbate the legalist 
morass by raising local defenses of the sort—such as state statutes of repose—that 
Justice Frankfurter decades ago characterized as inconsistent with the statute. See
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 63-65 (1955) (stating that the 
FTCA “cuts the ground from under” the doctrine of sovereign immunity and is “not 
self-defeating by covertly embedding the casuistries of municipal liability for 
torts”); see also George A. Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at the Agency Level: The 
FTCA Administrative Process, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 661 (1985) (warning 
against the government’s “apparent practice of routinely raising technical defects in 
a claim as a jurisdictional defense in FTCA litigation, even when the defect relates 
to purely regulatory as opposed to statutory requirements and even though the 
agency processed and denied the claim on its merits during the administrative 
phase”).
32. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 162-63 (1990). 
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the other branches tend to push those injuries out of view as not 
important or as not meriting attention. In classic Holmesian fashion,33
a claim that is dismissed as outside the government’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity may tend perversely to ratify the status quo; the 
government conduct that forms the core of the litigation is ignored 
while savings to the public fisc are celebrated. Whether harm 
actually occurred and reform is needed are questions that fall out of 
the picture.  
The point of this Article is neither to criticize the strategy of 
legalization nor to urge elimination of the FTCA’s damages 
remedy.34 Rather, the goal is to recommend accountability 
mechanisms that can supplement the FTCA through political action, 
so that elected branches do not retreat from problems behind the 
shield of legalist excuses. Commentary observes that Congress often 
lacks “information needed to understand the capacity and limitations 
of the courts.”35 So, too, Congress lacks information needed to 
understand the capacity and limitations of judicial decisions—
specifically, to decipher the signals that dismissed FTCA suits send 
about agency performance. At a time of acute government 
dysfunction,36 a project aimed at educating Congress to cure its 
                                                     
33. See United States v. Thompson (The Western Maid), 257 U.S. 419, 433 
(1922) (“[If t]he United States has not consented to be sued for torts, . . . it cannot be 
said that in a legal sense the United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is a tort 
in a legal sense only because the law has made it so.”).
34. Commentators disagree as to whether tort liability deters public actors 
from misconduct. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, 
Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347-48
(2000) (arguing that the traditional tort compensation system does not deter the 
government in the same manner as a private entity), with Myriam E. Gilles, In 
Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort 
Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 847-48 (2001) (arguing that the traditional tort 
system does have a deterrent effect on governmental actors). Even when money 
judgments are entered in an FTCA suit, the damages generally are not charged 
against the agency’s budget (the exception is for judgments that are less than 
$2,500), and the individual officer is absolutely immune from judgment for torts 
done in the course of employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2012). Nevertheless, the 
compensatory and social-trust goals of damage awards are distinct from that of 
deterrence and are important to affected individuals as well as to the public. 
35. Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND 
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 7, 10 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 
1988). 
36. See, e.g., Cameron Joseph, Government Dysfunction Biggest Threat to 
U.S.?, HILL (May 11, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-
room/205797-gates-biggest-threat-to-america-is-government-dysfunction 
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misperceptions about case dismissals may appear not only naïve and 
esoteric, but also so narrow as to be trivial. To the contrary, the 
project has conceptual and practical urgency given the principle of 
public accountability that informs the FTCA and the range of 
problems to which the statute applies—problems that cut across 
agencies, employees, and partisan interest. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets the stage by 
explaining the jurisdictional and procedural framework of the 
federal-tort claims process. The FTCA is well known as a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, but is less familiar in its practical details outside 
the special circle of plaintiff-side tort lawyers and government 
lawyers.37 Understanding the framework helps to explain the 
inexorable trend toward legalism in the judiciary’s approach; it also 
highlights the error in conflating a dismissed federal-tort claim with 
a finding that the government’s conduct was neither injurious nor 
negligent.  
Part II looks at two categories of FTCA cases with an eye 
toward the information that dismissed lawsuits might generate about 
agency performance: cases dismissed on procedural grounds for 
failure to meet the requirement of agency presentment and cases 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because the claim is said to be 
outside the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. In both, 
dismissal of the suit means that the claim is “forever barred,” and 
court-ordered damages will never be available.38 The cases 
discussed—admittedly not a scientific sample—mark government 
“victories,” illustrate a typical ground of pre-merits dismissal, and 
show how the dismissal encourages political “retreatism” by 
deflecting legislative attention away from what may be a serious 
problem of agency performance because the court instead has 
focused on technical defects in the plaintiff’s case. Although the 
dismissal may save the taxpayer money in the short run, the public 
suffers a considerable cost if Congress fails even to investigate the 
distress signals that these decisions send. I argue that these cases 
could serve as “early warnings” to Congress of agency problems; 
they also may sound the unwelcome “thirteenth chime” of a clock, 
indicating the persistence of a problem despite the appearance of 
institutional regularity. 
                                                                                                               
(discussing statements made by former Defense Secretary Robert Gates that 
congressional gridlock threatened national security). 
37. See generally PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 
ACT (2012).  
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401. 
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Part III turns to reform. My aim is to leverage dismissed FTCA 
cases to regulatory advantage—to turn information costs into 
information benefits—by complementing legal accountability with 
political accountability through enhanced oversight mechanisms.39 It 
is broadly acknowledged that an information gap exists between 
Congress and the courts, and that mediating structures can improve 
inter-branch communication.40 In an effort toward bridging the 
judicial–legislative divide, the Governance Institute created a pilot 
project enabling Congress to take a “second look at laws” when court 
decisions identify grammar errors, textual gaps, or legal ambiguity 
that warrant “statutory housekeeping” and technical revision.41 Court 
decisions dismissing FTCA claims on procedural or jurisdictional 
grounds likewise require a second look—at the agency conduct that 
precipitated the filing of the lawsuit. Yet every branch of government 
lacks incentives to respond to or to act on the information that these 
decisions contain. The court has declined to reach the merits and has 
barred the claim forever, the U.S. Attorney’s office has declared 
victory, and the agency whose employees are implicated in the suit 
likely would prefer to keep performance problems under the radar. 
Inviting Congress to take a second look at agency performance 
through the lens of dismissed FTCA cases resonates with “new 
governance” theories and their emphasis on learning and dynamic 
feedback as a basis for policy formation.42 The proposal would 
support efforts to increase dialogue between legislators and courts, 
                                                     
39. Of course, similar mechanisms should be in place when the government 
loses an FTCA suit. The theory of tort liability is that a money judgment motivates 
the tortfeasor to take a second look at practices that do not produce optimal levels of 
care. Whether that theory works in practice is an open question. Unless agencies are 
required to do so, it is unlikely that they will conduct an after-action report to 
determine whether existing rules and regulations, methods of training, levels of 
supervision, and so forth contributed to the alleged injuries. But the practice would 
be a sound one. See, e.g., Roger E. Honomichl, Claims Judge Advocate 
Communication with Medical Treatment Facilities, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 63 
(reporting that although Army claims personnel prepared after-action reports on paid 
medical malpractice claims, the information was not routinely transmitted to 
medical staff who sought access to this information for guidance “on how to avoid 
substandard care”).
40. See, e.g., Katzmann, supra note 35, at 7. 
41. See Robert A. Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in 
Statutory Communication Between Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 
GEO. L.J. 2189, 2189 n.3, 2190 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
42. See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Policy as Learning: A New 
View of an Old Landscape, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 322, 322 (2001) (putting forward 
“a learning model [as] a useful way to understand and explain policy change”).
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and would encourage communication between lawmakers and 
constituents. The proposal is consistent with commentary, including 
my own work with Kevin E. Davis, arguing that litigation is a public 
good that provides policy makers with important information that 
may not be available from other sources.43 And the argument takes 
account of principal–agent problems by acknowledging that a third-
party overseer might be needed in place of Congress to undertake the 
suggested review. At a time when commentators are focused on how 
government can nudge citizens to take appropriate action, the 
proposal uses citizen grievances to nudge Congress to exercise 
meaningful oversight of government conduct and to achieve 
regulatory reform when needed.44 To come full circle, Part III returns 
to the question of compensation for the victims of government 
negligence when claims are held not cognizable within the meaning 
of the FTCA.  
I. FEDERAL TORTS, JURISDICTION, AND THE MEANING OF 
PRE-TRIAL DISMISSAL
Many claims fail under the FTCA, not because the court finds 
that the government’s actions were not negligent or injurious, but 
because the suit is dismissed for procedural defects and a lack of 
jurisdiction. This Part describes the complicated procedures that a 
claimant must navigate in order to avoid having her complaint 
dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds; it sketches out the 
kinds of information that the lawsuit potentially generates; and it 
seeks to explain why claims that are dismissed on procedural 
grounds or for lack of jurisdiction have extremely low salience and 
are likely to remain unknown or invisible to most lawmakers.  
A. The FTCA’s “Jurisdictional Brand”
Congress enacted the FTCA in 1946 with the goal of providing 
persons injured by government negligence an “easy and simple” 
pathway to federal judicial relief.45 To that end, the statute grants the 
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over  
                                                     
43. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 513-15 (2011) (referring to information as a “key 
byproduct of public adjudication”).
44. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
45. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953). 
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civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . 
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government 
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable 
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred.46
Nevertheless, practice under the FTCA has become difficult and 
complex, complicated by 1966 amendments that establish a two-tier 
decision making process and by judicial decisions that impose 
additional procedural requirements. The FTCA’s “jurisdictional 
brand,” as one appeals court has described it, is now “replete with 
mandates, deadlines, requirements and exceptions” and “cannot be 
reasonably classified as claimant-friendly.”47 In consequence, large 
numbers of FTCA suits are dismissed on jurisdictional or procedural 
grounds before the court has considered the merits or the parties have 
undertaken discovery; these dismissals may inadvertently 
camouflage serious administrative problems and encourage the 
political branches to retreat from investigating problems despite the 
need for reform. 
B. Administrative Gatekeeping 
The 1946 statute by design shifted responsibility for disputes 
about government negligence from Congress to the Article III 
courts.48 Initially, the FTCA gave the claimant the option of either 
immediately filing a federal lawsuit or instead first trying to obtain 
an administrative settlement that would obviate the need for 
litigation (at least for claims that were valued at less than $2,500).49
In 1966, Congress amended the FTCA to mandate agency review 
and to expand the agency’s settlement authority.50 The statutory 
change resulted in a further shift of responsibility, this time from the 
                                                     
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012). 
47. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 807-08 (8th Cir. 2011). 
48. See Bermann, supra note 31, at 531. 
49. Id. at 530-32.  
50. See id. at 531-32. Currently settlement may be finalized without the 
prior written approval of the Attorney General if for less than $25,000, and even 
here exceptions apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (providing that the heads of federal 
agencies “in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may 
consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any [FTCA] claim”).
Prior to the amendment, 80% of all litigated cases settled, but the statistics do not 
indicate whether settlement came before or after discovery. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-
1532, at 6-9 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516-17.  
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courts to the agencies whose actions were involved with the events 
giving rise to the claim of injury.51 The statute now provides that 
“[a]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim . . . unless the 
claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate 
Federal agency.”52
What does it mean to present a claim to an agency? The statute 
only indirectly addresses this question. One section provides that a 
court action cannot “be instituted for any sum in excess of the 
amount of the claim presented to the federal agency,” other than 
when newly discovered evidence or intervening facts impact the 
amount of the claim.53 In addition, the Attorney General has 
promulgated regulations, stating:  
[A] claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency 
receives from a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal representative, 
an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, 
accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury to 
or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged to have occurred by 
reason of the incident; and the title or legal capacity of the person signing, 
and is accompanied by evidence of his authority to present a claim on 
behalf of the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guardian, 
or other representative.54
Another requirement of presentment is set out in a separate 
statutory section governing the period for filing a claim with the 
agency.55 The claim must be “presented in writing to the appropriate 
Federal agency within two years” of the claim’s accrual, regardless 
of the state statute of limitations that would apply to a private suit.56
                                                     
51. See Bermann, supra note 31, at 531. 
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The sole exceptions from the requirement of 
presentment are claims that arise by compulsory counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-
party claim. Id.; see, e.g., Thompson v. Wheeler, 898 F.2d 406, 410 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(providing an example of a third-party complaint that was removed to federal court, 
treated as an FTCA suit, and presentment was not required). 
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b).  
54. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2014). 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).  
56. Id. Under the Attorney General’s regulations, if a claim is presented to 
the wrong agency, the receiving agency “shall transfer it forthwith to the appropriate 
agency,” advising the claimant of the transfer, and if the correct agency cannot be 
identified, will return the claim to the claimant. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). Moreover, if 
multiple agencies are “or may be involved in the events giving rise to the claim,” an 
agency that has been presented with the claim “shall contact all other affected 
agencies” to determine which agency shall “investigate and decide the merits of the 
claim,” and the designated agency shall inform the claimant of its role. Id.
§ 14.2(b)(2). It follows that in presenting a claim, a claimant is expected to “identify 
each agency to which the claim is submitted”; if the claim fails to indicate that 
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The statute does not say what procedures agencies should use in 
investigating or settling the claims that are presented; regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General provide “guidance,” including 
authorizing the use of alternative dispute resolution, but the 
regulations make clear that they do “not create or establish any right 
to enforce any provision . . . on behalf of any claimant against the 
United States.”57 Typically, agency staff responsible for investigating 
                                                                                                               
multiple agencies were involved in the events giving rise to the injury, “and any one 
of the concerned Federal agencies takes final action on that claim,” the settlement is 
conclusive upon the claimant who is barred from seeking additional relief. Id.
§ 14.2(b)(3). However, a second agency may treat the final agency decision as a 
request for reconsideration, unless federal litigation already has been filed. Id. 
Conversely, if the claimant files a new claim with the second agency, the six-month 
rule is not tolled “unless the second agency specifically and explicitly treats the 
second submission as a request for reconsideration . . . and so advises the claimant.” 
Id. § 14.2(b)(4). 
57. 28 C.F.R. § 14.6. Some agencies have promulgated regulations for this 
purpose. As an example, consider regulations of the Department of Agriculture: 
(e)  Advice to Prospective Claimants. When a private person complains 
of injury or loss of property or personal injury or death alleged to be 
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an agency 
employee, and expresses an intention to seek monetary compensation 
for damages from the Government, the agency must inform the 
person of procedures for filing a claim under the FTCA. 
 Unless a private person appears to have incurred concrete damages 
and to have expressed an intention to seek monetary compensation 
from the United States, agency personnel should not encourage or 
require them to submit FTCA claims. . . . Mere expression of 
dissatisfaction with the conduct of agency programs does not provide 
grounds for suggesting a claim under the FTCA would be an 
appropriate method to indicate such dissatisfaction. 
. . . . 
Where a claim has been submitted by an attorney for the claimant, all 
correspondence should be directed to the attorney rather than the 
claimant. 
(g)  Administrative Report. When the claim is forwarded to OGC for 
determination, it must be accompanied by a single memorandum in 
narrative form setting forth the agency position on the claim. 
The administrative report should be reviewed by the Tort Contact to 
ensure that it contains: 
(1)  A background description of the program involved, referencing 
statutory authority and applicable regulations. 
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and processing the claim will require the claimant to provide 
supporting information, and failure to do so can result in the denial 
of the claim. Again, the Attorney General’s regulations enumerate 
some of the kinds of evidence that might be required.58 Agencies 
have not elected to be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; the usual rules of federal evidentiary privilege do not 
attach to the claimant’s disclosures; and the agency does not provide 
an indigent or uninformed claimant with legal counsel or paralegal 
assistance.59 The claimant has no symmetrical right to obtain 
                                                                                                               
(2) A complete description of the events in question, including 
references to documents included and a response to every 
allegation made in the claim. 
(3)  An agency analysis of who was at fault for losses or damages 
alleged in the claim, referencing the opinion of technical 
experts, who may be either non-involved agency personnel or 
outside consultants, as necessary. 
(4)  An analysis of damages claimed, unless OGC advises that it 
does not need them. 
(5)  Any policy reasons arguing for or against settlement. 
(6)  Details of any claims USDA might have against the claimant, 
whether or not they arose out of the incident which is the subject 
of the claim against USDA. 
To the administrative report should be attached copies of all 
documents relevant to the issues involved in the claim. The claim and 
supporting documents should be submitted to OGC in triplicate. 
Original agency records should not be forwarded to OGC unless 
specifically requested. However, they should be preserved and 
remain available for use in litigation. 
Office of the General Counsel Directive 2510-001, Claims Against the United States 
§ 7(e)-(g) (U.S.D.A. 1995). 
58. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a)(1)-(6) (providing that in “a claim based on 
death, the claimant may be required to submit” documentation that includes an
authenticated death certificate, information about employment and salary, 
information about survivors and support provided to each, itemized bills for medical 
and burial expenses, and information about decedent’s “general physical and mental 
condition before death”). The regulations further require a physician’s detailed 
statement if damages for pain and suffering are claimed, as well as “[a]ny other 
evidence or information which may have a bearing on either the responsibility of the 
United States for the death or the damages claimed.” Id. § 14.4(a)(7)-(8). 
59. Some agencies have designed their claims-investigation processes to 
shield all intra-agency information under the attorney–client privilege. See, e.g.,
Office of the General Counsel Directive 2510-001, supra note 57, § (7)(c) 
(“Investigation. When an agency receives a claim or learns of an incident likely to 
result in a, claim, it is responsible for ensuring that an investigation of the incident is 
undertaken and for the preservation of all relevant evidence. Any such investigation 
is conducted at the request of OGC [Office of General Counsel], and any report 
derived from such investigation is considered attorney work product.”).
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information from the agency and is not given access to any 
information about the events leading to the injury, or even the name 
of the officer or officers who engaged in the tortious conduct. 
Although the claimant may seek information about the events 
through the Freedom of Information Act, that statute exempts from 
disclosure many categories of information that might be significant 
to the claimant’s establishing liability;60 moreover, many claimants 
appear before the agency pro se and may not know about FOIA or 
how to use it.  
While the claim is pending before the agency, the claimant may 
amend the claim “at any time prior to final agency action.”61 The 
agency has six months from the date of any amendment to reach a 
decision, and the claimant’s time to file in court “shall not accrue 
until six months after the filing of an amendment.”62 Otherwise, once 
the agency has “finally denied” the claim and sent written denial by 
certified or registered mail, the claimant has six months to file a 
federal action.63 If the agency does not deny the claim within the six-
month period, the claimant may elect to proceed to court.64
C. The Involuntary Federal Plaintiff 
The other route into federal court may be called involuntary: 
An injured party files a garden-variety personal-injury suit in state 
court, not knowing that the tortfeasor is an agent or employee of the 
United States, and defendant then removes the action to federal 
court. Initially, the FTCA did not bar the injured party in this 
circumstance from suing the federal employee in state court.65 Two 
statutory enactments have closed off this possibility. A 1962 
amendment makes the FTCA the exclusive remedy for tort actions 
against federal agencies,66 and a 1988 amendment, resulting from 
enactment of the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
Compensation Act (known as the Westfall Act), makes the FTCA the 
exclusive remedy for tort actions against federal employees arising 
                                                     
60. See, e.g., Crumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(discussing the relation between FOIA requests and the FTCA exclusion of 
discretionary functions from liability). 
61. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(c). 
62. Id.; see Donald N. Zillman, Presenting a Claim Under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REV. 961, 985 (1983) (discussing the procedure). 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012). 
64. Id.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1952). 
66. Act of Sept. 21, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539. 
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from the scope of their employment.67 When a suit is mistakenly filed 
in state court, the Attorney General defends the lawsuit, certifies that 
the employee was working in the scope of federal employment, 
substitutes the United States for the employee, and removes the 
action to federal court.68 The Westfall Act bars relief against 
individual employees for torts committed in the course of 
employment even if the FTCA precludes relief against the 
government.69  
D. Procedural-Turned-Jurisdictional Bases for Dismissal  
Once the tort claim becomes a federal lawsuit, the government 
may seek to dismiss the action on a number of threshold grounds. 
Some of these grounds are typical of suits involving the United 
States as a defendant.70 Other procedural rules are special to federal-
tort cases. In particular, courts treat the condition of presenting a 
claim to an agency as a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be 
waived; moreover, a claim must include a written statement that is 
sufficiently detailed and that specifies a sum certain for the damages 
sought or else it will be jurisdictionally barred.71 The circuits are 
divided as to the jurisdictional significance of the Attorney General’s 
regulation requiring proof of representative authority.72
                                                     
67. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4564. 
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c)-(d) (2012). “Westfall” certification also takes place 
if the suit is filed in federal court but names the federal employee rather than the 
United States as a party. See Maron v. United States, 126 F.3d 317, 325-26 (4th Cir. 
1997).    
  However, if the suit is filed in federal court and names the federal 
agency rather than the United States as a party, Westfall certification is not available 
and the case may be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective if the limitations period 
for amendment under Federal Rule 15 has run. See Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749 
F.2d 1386, 1388-90 (9th Cir. 1984). Indeed, a plaintiff may be subject to sanctions 
under Federal Rule 11 for naming the agency as the defendant. See K.W. Thompson 
Tool Co. v. United States, 656 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (D.N.H. 1987), aff’d on other 
grounds, 836 F.2d 721 (1st Cir. 1988).  
69. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). 
70. For example, the commencement of the FTCA suit is subject to the 
special service rules and other special procedural advantages that apply to the United 
States when it is a litigant in federal court. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(1). Failure 
to meet these rules could result in dismissal of the suit. 
71. See supra Sections I.A-B.
72. See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-0660, 2013 WL 
5492311, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013), aff’d, No. 2:09-CV-0660, 2014 WL 576196 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014). Initially, the Attorney General’s regulation applied only 
to presentment to the agency under 28 U.S.C. § 2672, but by amendment in 1987 the 
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The procedural-turned-jurisdictional requirements of 
presentment and sum certain have been called “unyielding”73 and 
“mandatory,”74 and are grounds for the court’s dismissing of the suit 
even if the agency earlier had accepted the administrative claim and 
investigated the incident, and the claimant showed good faith efforts 
to comply with the requirements.75 Indeed, even a trivial deviation 
                                                                                                               
Attorney General extended its reach to include presentment as a condition of federal 
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 2675. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1987). The regulation thus 
purports to add a third condition—proof of representative capacity—to the statute’s 
requisites to jurisdiction. Presumably, the Attorney General is without authority to 
narrow the waiver of the United States to suit in federal court; its authority is only to 
define the scope of the agency’s settlement power. See Byrne v. United States, 804 
F. Supp. 577, 581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The better reading is that the regulation 
imposes a claim-processing condition but not a jurisdictional condition to suit.  
73. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated sub 
nom. on other grounds, United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64 (1987). 
74. Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
75. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107-08, 113 (1993) 
(affirming dismissal of FTCA complaint filed by pro se prisoner when the 
administrative claim, later denied, was filed four months after the filing of the 
lawsuit even though substantial progress in the lawsuit had not occurred). See also
Donovan v. Bureau of Prisons, where the court dismissed a prisoner’s FTCA suit, 
filed pro se, for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies when the following 
steps had been taken:  
Prior to September 7, 2006, Donovan submitted his claim to a Program 
Director. (Docket No. 16-2.) On September 7, 2006, the Program Director 
denied Donovan’s claim and instructed him to appeal to the Community 
Corrections Manager if he was unsatisfied. (Docket No. 16-2.) On 
September 12, 2006, Donovan appealed to, the court assumes, the 
Community Corrections Manager. (Docket No. 19 at 1, 6.) This appeal 
was denied on December 16, 2006. (Docket No. 19 at 6.) Donovan then 
appealed, (Docket No. 19 at 6), but it is unclear to whom he appealed. The 
next step in the process would [be] an appeal to the Regional Director, 28 
C.F.R. § 542.15, and therefore the court shall presume that this is to whom 
the plaintiff appealed. Donovan alleges that he received no response and 
does not allege that he has pursued any further remedies. 
This administrative path is the proper path for an inmate to exhaust a 
claim relating to an aspect of his confinement, but it is not the proper path 
for an inmate to exhaust a claim under the FTCA. The fact that the BOP 
has numerous divergent administrative processes is not meant to act as a 
trap to unwary litigants. Rather, it is designed to ensure more efficient 
processing of inmate claims. In fact, 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(c) states, “If an 
inmate raises an issue in a request or appeal that cannot be resolved 
through the Administrative Remedy Program, [(28 C.F.R. part 542, 
subpart B)] the Bureau will refer the inmate to the appropriate statutorily-
mandated procedures.”
Dismissed Federal-Tort Suits 203
from procedural requirements at the agency level can trigger a later 
jurisdictional dismissal—for example, a complaint was dismissed as 
failing to state a sum certain  when the claim alleged an amount “not 
in excess of . . . $50,000.”76 In addition, a state case removed to 
federal court is subject to the same procedural and jurisdictional 
conditions as a suit that begins through the administrative process: 
The newly minted federal plaintiff is expected to present a claim to 
the agency and to exhaust the administrative process before 
proceeding in federal court. The federal court will dismiss the 
complaint as premature if the plaintiff cannot show that she 
previously presented the claim to the agency and that she declined 
the agency’s settlement; in some circumstances, it will be too late for 
the claimant to present the claim to an administrative agency even 
though the statute of limitations has not run on the tort itself, and the 
suit will be barred “forever.”77
                                                                                                               
Donovan never requested a sum certain, as is required for claims under the 
FTCA, but instead requested “that this Office instruct officials at the 
Parsons House and/or BOP to honor the court’s Order of waiver and to 
reimburse me the payments already made as such a collection would 
clearly violate the sentencing judge’s Order of waiver.” (Docket No. 19 at 
5.) Thus, it was evident that Donovan was pursuing his administrative 
remedies regarding an aspect of his confinement, see 28 C.F.R. part 542, 
subpart B, rather than his tort remedies, see 28 C.F.R. part 543, subpart C., 
and therefore, assuming that the BOP had an affirmative duty to inform 
Donovan he had not chosen the proper path to exhaust a claim under the 
FTCA, there was not sufficient reason for the BOP to conclude that 
Donovan intended to pursue a FTCA claim. 
No. 07-C-105, 2008 WL 4603337, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 16, 2008) (citation 
omitted).
76. Schwartzman v. Carmen, 995 F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Montoya v. United States, 841 F.2d 
102, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no jurisdiction when the damages sought were 
“in excess of $1,500” for property damage and the sum was not set forth for 
personal injury (internal quotation marks omitted)); Keene Corp. v. United States, 
700 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding no jurisdiction when the damages sought 
were “$1,088,135 and . . . an additional amount yet to be ascertained” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
77. A 1988 amendment treats the claim as timely if it “would have been 
timely had it been filed on the date the underlying civil action was commenced, 
and . . . the claim is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within 60 days after 
dismissal of the civil action.” Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 6, 102 
Stat. 4565 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5) (2012)). The litigant could face 
forfeiture even if the state statute of limitations is longer than the FTCA’s two-year 
period governing presentment to the agency. See Celestine v. Mount Vernon 
Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court of 
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If the case survives dismissal at this stage, the sum certain set 
out in the original claim sets a cap on damages that the claimant-
turned-plaintiff may judicially seek.78 Some courts have held that the 
ad damnum clause in the judicial complaint—as well as the theories 
underpinning the request for damages—must align identically with 
the claim presented to the agency. Other courts have held that a 
claim can be sufficient, even if it does not identify its legal theory, if  
it sets forth detailed facts from which a legal theory might be 
inferred by “a legally trained reader.”79
The suit proceeds in federal court as any statutory matter 
would, with the panoply of case management conferences and 
information exchange. During the discovery process, plaintiff will 
likely seek access to information about the events producing the 
injury, the personnel involved, and the government’s investigation of 
the incident. In response, the government may seek to withhold 
information on grounds of privilege, citing defenses that are 
available under state law80 or work-product protection to shield 
investigative reports.81 In some cases, the government may seek to 
invoke executive privilege as a bar to disclosure.82 If the case 
proceeds to trial, the district court, as in any suit, is required to 
prepare findings of fact and to state conclusions of law.83 The 
Supreme Court has underscored that the findings in an FTCA suit 
must articulate facts in non-conclusory and definite terms.84
Similarly, the trial court’s findings supporting damage awards must 
                                                                                                               
the United States has granted certiorari in a pair of cases that pertain to equitable 
tolling that would affect the result in Celestine. See supra note 13. 
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). 
79. Murrey v. United States, 73 F.3d 1448, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996).  
80. See Menses v. U.S. Postal Serv., 942 F. Supp. 1320, 1323-34 (D. Nev. 
1996) (rejecting the government’s invocation of a state statute barring disclosure of 
unemployment records). 
81. See Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 
(refusing to compel the government to produce a hospital board’s reports inquiring 
into the decedent’s suicide for purposes of changes in procedures, but compelling 
the production of portions of the record depicting the facts of the event).  
82. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3-4, 11 (1953) (holding that 
necessity for information did not overcome the government’s privilege against 
revealing military secrets in FTCA suit involving the crash of an Air Force plane 
during a test of secret equipment). 
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
84. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 n.8 (1953) (“Statements 
conclusory in nature are to be eschewed in favor of statements of the preliminary 
and basic facts on which the District Court relied. Otherwise, their findings are 
useless for appellate purposes.” (citation omitted)).
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be stated with particularity.85 The court’s final judgment is subject to 
appeal as a matter of right; in certain circumstances various non-final 
orders—such as the denial of a motion to dismiss on discretionary-
function grounds—may be immediately reviewable under the 
collateral-order doctrine.86
E. The Jurisdictional Wild Card 
Even if a federal-tort plaintiff hurdles the procedural 
requirements of presenting a written claim to the agency and sets 
forth a sum certain for damages, shows evidence of representative 
authority for pursuing the claim, survives a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, goes through discovery, survives a motion for 
summary judgment, and proceeds to trial, the lawsuit nevertheless 
might face dismissal on jurisdictional grounds if the challenged 
action that forms the core of the claim is found to be outside the 
government’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The statute’s grant of 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 is subject to exclusions set out in 
a separate section of the United States Code and to an exception that 
the Supreme Court has judicially created.87 Boiled down, jurisdiction 
is withheld from thirteen categories of conduct: claims arising from 
“a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved 
be abused”;88 “the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of 
letters or postal matter”;89 “the assessment or collection of any tax or 
customs duty, or the detention of any goods” (subject to 
exceptions);90 certain “suits in admiralty”;91 certain acts related to 
portions of Title 50 of the United States Code related to war and 
defense;92 acts resulting from quarantine;93 acts resulting from 
“assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
                                                     
85. See Fuchstadt v. United States, 434 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(issuing a remand order when the district court failed to itemize elements of a 
personal-injury award). 
86. See Lutz v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 994 F.2d 1477, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 
1991) (finding jurisdiction on immediate review of a denial of a motion to dismiss 
on Feres grounds); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 159 (1950). 
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012); Feres, 340 U.S. at 159.  
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
89. Id. § 2680(b). 
90. Id. § 2680(c). 
91. Id. § 2680(d). 
92. Id. § 2680(e). 
93. Id. § 2680(f). 
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deceit, or interference with contract rights”;94 “the fiscal operations 
of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system”;95
“combatant activities . . . during time of war”;96 from activities in a 
foreign country, of the Tennessee Valley Authority, of the Panama 
Canal Company, or of a “Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate 
credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.”97
These jurisdictional exclusions date mainly to the FTCA’s 
original enactment in 1948.98 A claim held to fall within one of these 
exceptions is outside the United States’ consent to suit—meaning, it 
is not cognizable under the statute—and the federal court is required 
to dismiss the action. As with any jurisdictional rule, the defect 
cannot be waived or forfeited and can be raised by the court sua 
sponte or by the government for the first time on appeal. In other 
contexts, the Supreme Court has expressed support for subject-matter 
jurisdiction rules that are “straightforward” and “[s]imple” so that 
they can produce “‘certainty and predictability.’”99 FTCA 
jurisdictional rules for the most part are neither straightforward nor 
simple; determining whether a claim is outside the government’s 
waiver may involve a fact-intensive inquiry about activities, 
supervision, and the course of employment. Much of this information 
can be learned only through discovery; for present purposes, what is 
important is the fact that even when the suit is dismissed, the 
jurisdictional inquiry will shed light on agency practice, personnel 
conduct, and internal agency procedures that pertain to such matters 
as training, supervision, and discipline, and could highlight 
administrative problems.  
F.  The Canary in the Coal Mine  
Every stage of the FTCA dispute process elicits information 
about agency practice that ought to be of interest to policy makers. 
At the claim stage, the claimant’s version of the incident is in 
primary view with all of the cognitive biases that an injured party 
                                                     
94. Id. § 2680(h) (noting that § 2680(g) was repealed in 1950). Jurisdiction 
is extended for “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the 
United States Government” claims arising “out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.” Id.
95. Id. § 2680(i).
96. Id. § 2680(j).
97. Id. § 2680(k)-(n). 
98. Id. § 2680. 
99. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l City 
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983)). 
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brings and without countervailing information from the 
government.100 At the administrative stage, information about agency 
practice could be available from the agency’s internal investigation, 
its communications with the claimant, and its response behind the 
scenes to procedures and practices that might have contributed to the 
alleged injury. During the judicial proceeding, additional information
will come to light through discovery and court papers concerning 
such topics as staff conduct, internal practices, and patterns of 
behavior that may be sub-standard. This information is available 
even if the lawsuit is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, to use 
a somewhat worn-out cliché, a judicially barred federal-tort suit is 
the proverbial canary in the coal mine warning of conditions that 
require further investigation and possible reform.101 Nevertheless, a 
number of factors obscure the informational significance of these 
decisions and give them exceptionally low salience. 
First, and most obviously, any government victory, even if on 
procedural or jurisdictional grounds, tends to be seen as a vindication 
of the government’s position on the merits, casting doubt on the truth 
of plaintiff’s allegations and creating the perception that the suit was 
filed to extort an unwarranted settlement.102 The combination of 
hindsight and outcome bias recasts the alleged victim of government 
misconduct as a renegade or at least as undeserving. Not all claims 
are credible; smoke does not always signify fire. But it is a mistake 
to assume that claims that do not make it through the FTCA’s 
procedural-turned-jurisdictional filter are fraudulent, trivial, or not 
deserving of further investigation. As an example, consider a case in 
which the court dismissed as time-barred a medical-malpractice 
claim filed on behalf of a child who was born with “serious medical 
problems including mental incompetency” because hospital 
personnel left the mother unattended in the labor room; the fact that 
the FTCA does not permit infancy to toll the limitations period does 
                                                     
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2012). 
101. Ben Zimmer, A Canary, a Coal Mine and a Cliché, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
14, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230491490457943 
7322017716030 (“A once lively figure of speech has been deadened into a cliché for 
any early warning signal.”).
102. Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of 
Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1198-99 (2014) (drawing a distinction 
between implausible and frivolous litigation). 
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not diminish the significance of the negligent medical practice if 
investigated and shown to be true.103
Second, because the complaint alleges negligence, it is easy to 
shrug one’s shoulders and take Mr. Micawber’s view that “‘accidents 
will occur’” notwithstanding the agency’s best efforts.104 Cognitive 
bias that favors the social status quo tends to discourage the 
government’s acknowledging of institutional problems and instead to 
encourage casting tort victims as hapless or unlucky.105 Moreover, 
legal doctrine tends to frame many public-law problems as merely 
localized or atomistic mishaps that involve an individual situation 
without broader significance.106 The private-bill origins of the FTCA 
reinforce the tendency of seeing tort claims against the United States 
as private problems unrelated to  structural causes or and 
undeserving of  national attention;107 a consistent criticism of the 
private-bill system was that it wasted congressional time on 
insignificant private problems and diverted attention from significant 
public problems.108 In practice, the functional line between a private 
                                                     
103. See McCall ex rel. Estate of Bess v. United States, 310 F.3d 984, 985 
(7th Cir. 2002).  
104. See CHARLES DICKENS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF DAVID COPPERFIELD
291 (1850) (stating that “‘accidents will occur in the best regulated families’”). 
105. See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and 
Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CAL. L.
REV. 1119, 1119 (2006) (explaining that consistent with System Justification 
Theory, decision makers may have a self-interest “to defend and justify the social 
status quo”); see also Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the 
Ossification Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251 (2009) (considering 
the effect of cognitive biases on agency action in the face of institutional problems). 
106. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (suggesting “that the antidiscrimination principle 
embodies a very limited conception of equality, one that is highly individualistic and 
confined to assessing the rationality of means” and urging that “the group-
disadvantaging principle” better “represent[s] the ideal of equality”). 
107. Cf. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional 
Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 254 (1986) (explaining that the individual tort model 
as applied to government torts creates the danger that “injuries caused by 
institutional structures will not even be perceived”).
108. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1951) 
(stating that “the overwhelming purpose of Congress was to make changes of 
procedure which would enable it to devote more time to major public issues”); The
Federal Tort Claims Act, supra note 24, at 534 (reporting that the “system of private 
claim bills . . . has been denounced for usurpation of Congressional energies which 
might otherwise be devoted to consideration of important national problems”). The 
sentiment that private bills wasted congressional time dates back at least to the early 
nineteenth century. See Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act—A Statutory 
Interpretation, 35 GEO L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1946) (quoting John Quincy Adams’s statement 
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bill and public law was not always clear,109 and we need not engage 
with the private–public distinction110 to know that national policy 
draws from information that often starts with an individual: a patient 
dies in a hospital because of the waiting time for care;111 a female 
employee is barred from seeking equal pay for equal work;112 a fatal 
car accident takes place because of concealed defects in the ignition 
system.113 Nevertheless, “Mr. Micawber’s optimism”114 makes it easy 
                                                                                                               
in 1832, “‘There ought to be no private business before Congress.’” (citing 8 
MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 480 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1876)).  
109. Cf. THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW,
PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 463 (Sir David Lidderdale 
ed., 19th ed. 1976) (“[I]t is sometimes difficult to determine to which category 
particular bills belong, and the question may arise whether a public bill, in that it 
affects certain private interests, ought not more properly to have been introduced as 
a private bill, or whether a bill, introduced as a private bill, should be prevented 
from proceeding on the ground that its scope is so wide that it affects public 
policy.”).
110. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1982) (discussing “a virtual obsession with 
separating public and private law, both conceptually and practically, during the 
nineteenth century”).
111. See Drew Griffin, Scott Bronstein & Tom Cohen, Obama Signs $16 
Billion VA Overhaul into Law, CNN (Aug. 7, 2014, 3:50 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/07/politics/obama-va-bill/ (discussing the enactment 
of VA reforms and reporting that a daughter “watched her father die while waiting 
months just to see a doctor at the dysfunctional Department of Veterans Affairs”); 
see also Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, A Fatal Wait: Veterans Languish and Die 
on a VA Hospital’s Secret List, CNN (Apr. 23, 2014, 9:19 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/health/veterans-dying-health-care-delays/ 
(reporting that “[a]t least 40 U.S. veterans died waiting for appointments at the 
Phoenix Veterans Affairs Health Care system, many of whom were placed on a 
secret waiting list”). 
112. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(reversing the Supreme Court’s holding in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), that the statute of limitations for an equal-pay claim 
commences on the date of initial wage decisions, not the most recent paycheck).  
113. See Ryan Vlastelica, General Motors Issues Three New Recalls, Cites 
Ignition Systems, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2015, 12:36 PM) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/02/us-gm-recalls-reports-
idUSKBN0KA1RZ20150102 (stating ignition problems caused fatal accidents and 
led to recall of 2.5 million cars). 
114. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) (criticizing 
the Conley “‘no set of facts’” test as relying on “Mr. Micawber’s optimism”). 
Indeed, Dickens appropriated the phrase from an eighteenth-century treatise on 
fortifications and used only half the sentence: “But, notwithstanding all human 
precautions that can be taken, yet accidents will happen, which are to be repaired as 
soon as possible, and whereby the engineer will learn how to avoid them afterwards, 
in the remainder of his works.” JOHN MULLER, A TREATISE CONTAINING THE 
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for lawmakers to ignore dismissed suits that can be explained as 
deviant or idiosyncratic. 
Third, FTCA cases are filtered through an arduous but one-
sided administrative process—the agency investigates the claimant 
and compels disclosure from the claimant, but the claimant cannot 
obtain discovery from the agency. The investigative process is 
structured against disclosure by the agency—no information is 
released to the claimant about the policy or practice that may be at 
the core of the FTCA claim, and the agency is not required to report 
to Congress about unpaid claims.115 Cognitive biases could obscure 
the agency’s ability to detect error or misconduct among staff; at a 
minimum the investigating agency may lack the requisite incentives 
to bring intra-agency problems to light.116 Moreover, the absence of 
pre-litigation discovery during the agency proceeding makes it more 
difficult for a plaintiff to survive dismissal once she comes to court 
given heightened pleading requirements and the inability of  
overcoming informational barriers.117 For example, a challenge to the 
SEC’s failure to investigate the Madoff Ponzi scheme was dismissed 
when plaintiffs were unable to identify with specificity “mandatory 
directives” aimed at constraining SEC enforcement authority, and so 
the suit was barred under the discretionary-function exception 
without a serious review of the agency’s actions.118
Fourth, the FTCA recognizes that damage awards are a 
legitimate price of public accountability and seeks to spread the costs 
of government negligence from the individual victim to the general 
public.119 Nevertheless, federal-tort suits often are cast as drags on 
                                                                                                               
PRACTICAL PART OF FORTIFICATION IN FOUR PARTS 168 (1755), available at
https://archive.org/stream/atreatisecontai00mullgoog#page/n228/mode/2up/search/p
recautions. 
115. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2009). 
116. See Andrew Case, Note, Protecting Rights by Rejecting Lawsuits: 
Using Immunity to Prevent Civil Litigation from Eroding Police Obligations Under 
Brady v. Maryland, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 187, 226 (2010) (stating with 
respect to alleged constitutional violations by police that “confirmation bias can 
prevent even well-meaning supervisors from detecting error and disciplining 
subordinates”). 
117. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684-85. 
118. See Dichter-Mad Family Partners, LLP v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 
2d 1016, 1039-48 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 709 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2013). 
119. See Platis v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 254, 274 (D. Utah 1968), aff’d,
409 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1969) (“The Tort Claims Act reflects a strong public 
policy, recognized by Congress, to protect the citizenry from torts committed by the 
public servants, to lift the risks that may be ruinous if left to lie upon the individual 
victim of the particular accident . . . and to achieve an allocation and apportionment 
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the treasury: The Justice Department, itself burdened by budget cuts 
and staff reductions,120 includes information about FTCA suits in its 
annual reports, describing case dismissals—on whatever grounds—
as relieving the government from the burden of “unmerited 
damages.”121 Yet at this stage of the proceeding one cannot know 
whether damages are merited or unmerited; a court that has 
dismissed a suit on jurisdictional or procedural grounds has not 
reached the merits. For this reason, the decision should not be taken 
as ratification of the status quo, but rather as a signal that 
investigation of potential problems might be warranted. 
II. FTCA SUITS AS INFORMATION SIGNALS
Judicially barred FTCA suits typically do not attract a great 
deal of attention even though they may signal serious problems 
within an agency. This Part focuses on a pair of federal-tort 
decisions—in which the government was the prevailing party—to 
demonstrate the practical significance that these suits could hold for 
policy making and public accountability. I focus on procedural 
dismissals when the claimant is blocked from court for failure to 
meet the agency-presentment requirement and on jurisdictional 
dismissals when the claim is found to be outside the government’s
waiver of sovereign immunity. In some situations, the dismissed suit 
could function as an early warning of problems that have been 
ignored and need regulatory attention; in other situations, the 
dismissed suit could serve as the proverbial thirteenth chime of the 
clock, signaling systems that have broken down and need repair.  
                                                                                                               
of the loss among not a relatively small segment of the consuming public, but 
among the entire federal taxpaying public.”).
120. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FY 2015 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE 
PLANS 5 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/ 
2013/12/14/civ-justification.pdf (reporting that because of the budget freeze, the 
Civil Division of the Justice Department lost 265 staff, almost 17% of the Civil 
Division’s total staff).
121. Id. at 17 (showing a table entitled “Performance and Resources” that 
reports “Percent of defensive cases in which at least 85 percent of the claim is 
defeated”); see id. at 22 (reporting that “[c]ivil also defeats billions of dollars in 
unmerited damages”).
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A. Claim Presentment: Information About Mental Health Care for 
Veterans 
As previously indicated, Congress added the claim-presentment 
requirement to the FTCA in 1966 as a threshold barrier both to 
agency consideration and to judicial review. A later amendment 
extended the claim-presentment requirement to the agency-
settlement process. From the beginning, this condition elicited 
criticism—admittedly from plaintiff-side tort lawyers who felt 
themselves excluded from the amendment process—whether it was 
appropriate to condition access to federal court upon an initial 
administrative review by the agency involved in the tortious conduct. 
Moreover, without the benefit of discovery, it was objected that 
claimants were unlikely to know the full scope of their claim or be 
able to assess damages. Critics predicted that the requirement of 
presentment would curtail substantive rights and, at a minimum, 
delay payments even when liability was acknowledged.122
“Presentment” now forms the core of the FTCA dispute-resolution 
process, euphemistically described as “deceptively simple.”123 The 
requirement is intended to give the agency sufficient information to 
see if the claim is worth investigating and settling; yet a suit that is 
dismissed by the court for failing to meet the presentment 
requirement may be meritorious and point to agency problems that 
require investigation and reform.  
Consider the medical negligence claim at issue in Mader v. 
United States.124 On the second anniversary of the suicide of her 
husband, a veteran with a history of depression and paranoia, a 
widow submitted a wrongful death claim to the Veterans 
Administration.125 She started the claim process in the usual way, 
                                                     
122. See Philip H. Corboy, Revised Federal Tort Claims Act: A 
Practitioner’s View, 2 FORUM 67, 68 (1967) (stating that “while the purpose of the 
amendments is to produce primarily an administrative convenience in the handling 
of federal tort claims, it is likely that the amendments have ventured into the twilight 
zone between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ where there will be a great likelihood that 
they will infringe upon the substantive rights of claimants”).
123. Bermann, supra note 31, at 541. 
124. Mader v. United States, No. 8:08CV119, 2008 WL 5111047, at *1 (D. 
Neb. Dec. 2, 2008), rev’d, 619 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 654 F.3d 794 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
125. Id. at *1-2.
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submitting a written claim on Standard Form 95.126 The form listed 
the claimant as Nancy Mader, widow and personal representative of 
Robert Mader, and “was signed by ‘John P. Ellis, Attorney for 
Claimant.’”127 The form stated a sum certain for the damages claimed 
and described the injury: “The deceased Robert L. Mader, was 
improperly treated and medicated by Dr. Ruth Schmidtmayer of the 
VA Hospital, Lincoln, Nebraska, when she deviated from the 
standard of care by abruptly taking the deceased off of the drug 
Paxil. The decedent committed suicide on August 3, 2004.”128 On 
September 19, 2007, the VA denied the claim on two alternative 
grounds: First, claimant had failed to submit proof that she was the 
decedent’s representative or that her counsel had authority to present 
a claim on her behalf; and second, the VA had investigated the claim 
and failed to find negligence.129 As to the first ground, the federal 
appeals record shows that on August 21, 2006, the VA mailed a 
letter to claimant’s lawyer requesting proof of representative 
capacity; the appeals record also includes the VA’s statements that it 
telephoned counsel but again did not receive the proof.130 As to the 
second ground, the VA wrote:  
“This office has extensively reviewed the quality of the medical care that 
was provided to Robert Mader. The finished investigation included a 
detailed analysis of his medical records and an expert medical review by 
an independent out of state VA psychiatrist. The investigation revealed 
that Robert Mader was seen in a timely manner for his new-onset 
psychosis, appropriate medication changes were made and the appropriate 
follow up was arranged. The reviewer concluded that the discontinuation 
of Robert Mader’s use of Paroxetine (Paxtil) [sic] and the matter [sic] in 
which it was discontinued was entirely appropriate under the 
circumstances. The investigation failed to reveal any negligence by VA 
health care practitioners in rendering care to Robert Mader. Therefore, the 
claim is also denied on that basis[.”]131  
Six months later, in March 2008, decedent’s widow filed a 
wrongful death suit in federal court under the FTCA.132 The United 
                                                     
126. Id. at *2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STANDARD FORM 95: CLAIM 
FOR DAMAGE, INJURY, OR DEATH (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/SF-95.pdf. 
127. Mader, 2008 WL 5111047, at *2 (citation omitted). 
128. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Mader, 619 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 
2009) (No. 09-1025) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
129. Mader, 2008 WL 5111047, at *2. 
130. Id.
131. Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4-5, Mader,
No. 8:08CV119 (D. Neb. 2008), ECF No. 21 (citation omitted). 
132. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the view 
that the administrative claim was incomplete because the widow had 
not shown representative capacity on behalf of her husband.133 At the 
time of the motion, four circuits already had rejected the argument 
that proof of capacity is an element of presentment and did not treat 
the procedural requirement as jurisdictional.134 Nevertheless, the 
district court granted the motion with prejudice.135 The widow 
appealed, and a divided panel reversed, holding that in the Eighth 
Circuit a claimant is required to meet “minimal” presentment—
which includes only the statutory requirements of written notice to 
the agency and a sum certain—and that proof of representative 
authority, a requirement added by the Attorney General’s regulation, 
is not jurisdictional.136 En banc review was granted, and the district 
court’s decision was affirmed and the claim dismissed.137
As a “claims-processing rule,”138 the requirement that a 
claimant show proof that she has authority to pursue a claim on 
behalf of a decedent seems sound; the agency needs a basis upon 
which to reach a binding settlement in the face of intra-family 
disagreement. A presumption that a lawful widow has such authority 
would seem appropriate and efficient. The assets of many middle-
class families are exempt from probate, and a requirement of formal 
documentation could require the payment of fees and increase costs 
unnecessarily to the claimant. Moreover, as a matter of doctrine, 
Mader’s conclusion that the proof-of-authority rule is 
jurisdictional—and forever bars federal suit on the underlying tort 
claim—is textually at odds with the statute’s setting forth of only two 
conditions for presentment, the Supreme Court’s distinction between 
rules that are jurisdictional and those that involve claims-processing, 
the decisions of all circuit courts that have considered the issue, and 
a practical approach that would be more consistent with the FTCA’s 
goals. 
                                                     
133. Id. at 799, 802.  
134. Mader, 2008 WL 5111047, at *4 & n.2 (“Four circuits have held that 
‘minimal notice’ creates a statutory ‘claim’ for § 2675(a) purposes.”).
135. Mader, 654 F.3d at 799. 
136. Id.
137. Id. at 800. 
138. The Court has drawn a distinction between “claim-processing rules” 
that are not to be treated as jurisdictional and rules that limit the court’s power to 
hear a case. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161-63 (2010). The 
Court’s observation that the distinction “can be confusing in practice” finds support 
in the numerous FTCA cases that conflate these categories. Id. at 161. 
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The court’s treatment of representative capacity as a 
jurisdictional condition raises a significant issue.139 However, I focus 
on a different question: the lessons that Mader offers to Congress 
about the quality of mental health care at a VA hospital. The federal 
complaint and judicial decisions in the Mader case indicate that the 
decedent was a veteran with a history of depression and paranoia.140
Information available through public sources—West, Lexis, the 
PACER system—do not indicate his age, race, or service history. 
Decedent is the proverbial everyman whose life is a data point in 
national statistics. It is estimated that twenty-two veterans commit 
suicide every day—one veteran every eighty minutes.141 The high 
rate of suicide within the military is not limited to veterans: More 
soldiers died from self-inflicted wounds in 2013 than in combat.142
                                                     
139. On the jurisdictional issue, I suggest that Congress clarify that proof of 
representative authority is a claims-processing rule; further, the different affected 
agencies ought to consider issuing a regulation that a lawful spouse or widow is 
presumptively a representative of a decedent. The federal government can use a 
federal definition of spouse to include same-sex couples. Inevitably, intra-family 
disputes will arise; joinder is available if the presence of third parties is necessary to 
ensure complete relief and the avoidance of duplicative payment.  
140. Mader, 654 F.3d at 798. 
141. See Lindsay I. McCarl, “To Have No Yesterday”: The Rise of Suicide 
Rates in the Military and Among Veterans, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 393, 395 (2013) 
(citing MARGARET C. HARRELL & NANCY BERGLASS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC.,
LOSING THE BATTLE: THE CHALLENGE OF MILITARY SUICIDE 1 (2011), available at
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_LosingTheBattle_Harrell
Berglass.pdf; Erik K. Shinseki, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Remarks at 
the Suicide Prevention Conference (Jan. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.va.gov/opa/speeches/2010/10_0111hold.asp); JANET KEMP & ROBERT 
BOSSARTE, DEP’T OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, SUICIDE DATA REPORT, 2012, at 15 (2012), 
available at https://www.va.gov/opa/docs/Suicide-Data-Report-2012-final.pdf. 
Other studies report a suicide rate of eighteen deaths per day, or 3.2 times the rate of 
the general public. See Contessa M. Wilson, Note, Saving Money, Not Lives: Why 
the VA’s Claims Adjudication System Denies Due Process to Veterans with Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder and How the VA Can Avoid Judicial Intervention, 7 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 157, 158-59 (2010) (citing Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 
563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (referring to the “Katz Suicide Study,” 
dated February 21, 2008)). 
142. See Military Suicide Victims Deserve Respect, MORNING CALL (May 7, 
2013), http://articles.mcall.com/2013-05-07/opinion/mc-gold-star-mother-gehris-
20130507_1_gold-star-22-year-old-son-suicide (“I am a Gold Star mother. For those 
of you who do not know what that is, a Gold Star mother has a child who died in 
combat. There are many Gold Star mothers in the Lehigh Valley. Many of their 
children’s names are engraved on military monuments, except for those who
committed suicide. That means my son. I am very upset that he gave his life to 
protect the USA and that this is how he is being treated. There have been more 
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There also is a high rate of psychiatric disorders among soldiers 
returning home to civilian life,143 and post-traumatic stress disorder is 
now a recognized psychiatric condition among veterans.144
Medication also can heighten the risk of suicide.145 Again, we 
know from the published decisions that the decedent received mental 
health treatment for an unspecified period at a VA hospital prior to 
2004;146 during that period he apparently was prescribed Paxil.147 In 
May 2004, GlaxoSmithKline, the manufacturer of Paxil, issued a 
letter addressed to “Healthcare Professional,” stating that a Food and 
Drug Administration Public Health Advisory, dated March 22, 2004, 
“caution[s] physicians, their patients, and families about the need to 
closely monitor all patients . . . treated with antidepressants” such as 
Paxil, and that the FDA had proposed labeling changes to include a 
“warning recommending close observation of adult . . . patients 
treated” with Paxil “for worsening depression or the emergence of 
suicidality, particularly at the beginning of treatment or at the time of 
dose increases or decreases.”148 Presumably, the VA hospital 
received the GlaxoSmithKline warning; at the least, VA healthcare 
                                                                                                               
deaths among soldiers and Marines from suicide in the last year than fatalities in 
battle zones.”).
143. See Katherine Dubyak, Close, but No Cigar: Recent Changes to the 
Stressor Verification Process for Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
Why the System Remains Insufficient, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 655, 663-65 (2012). 
144. See Madeline McGrane, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the 
Military: The Need for Legislative Improvement of Mental Health Care for Veterans 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, 24 J.L. & HEALTH
183, 185-96 (2011) (providing an overview of PTSD and the armed services). 
145. See Aisling V. O’Sullivan, Comment, Walking a Fine Line: Are SSRIs 
Really Depression Wonder Drugs or Threats to Patient Safety?, 26 PACE L. REV. 
549, 552-54 (2006) (summarizing studies of the linkage between medication and 
suicide). 
146. Mader v. United States, 654 F.3d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
147. Mader v. United States, No. 8:08CV119, 2008 WL 511047, at *1-2 (D. 
Neb. Dec. 2, 2008). 
148. Letter from GlaxoSmithKline to Healthcare Professional (May 2004), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/safety/medwatch/safetyinformation/ 
safetyalertsforhumanmedicalproducts/ucm166499.pdf. A Department of Health & 
Human Services letter dated June 9, 2004, provided the company with a non-
exhaustive list of violations involving “false or misleading” representations; the 
letter emphasized that patients treated with Paxil “should be monitored . . . when 
discontinuing treatment” and that “abrupt cessation” was not recommended. Letter 
from Kay A. Chitale, Consumer Promotion Analyst, Dept. of Health & Human 
Servs., to P. Kaia Agarwal, Senior Dir., Regulatory Affairs, GlaxoSmithKline (June 
9, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofV
iolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm055293.pdf.  
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professionals ought to be expected to meet standards of care that 
include current FDA warnings. On May 28, 2004, a VA healthcare 
employee “instructed Mr. Mader to taper off his previously 
prescribed medicine of Paxil by taking ½ tablet daily for one week 
and then stopping entirely.”149 On or about August 3, 2004, the 
decedent committed suicide by shooting himself in the head.150 The 
record does not state that decedent was suicidal before he began his 
treatment; the record does not state whether the prescribing physician 
warned decedent or his wife of the possibility of suicide as a side 
effect; the record does not state that the prescribing physician or 
anyone at the hospital monitored the decedent. All we know is that 
the VA’s denial of the wrongful death claim, which misstates the 
prescribed drug’s over-the-counter name, was based on an internal 
investigation that determined its healthcare professionals did not 
deviate from the standard of care.151 The lawsuit never went to 
discovery—the suit was a procedural “victory” for the United 
States152—and we are left in the dark whether other veterans received 
similar treatment that possibly contributed to their deaths. 
Cases like Mader could provide policy makers with an 
important early warning about problems with agency practice—
about the lack of communication from one agency to another, a 
failure to update staff about recent professional developments, 
insufficient client counseling, and so forth. Claims investigators are 
expected to expedite settlement or denial, not to consider whether 
systemic reform is needed. I do not have access to the internal 
investigative reports and do not know whether any information was 
communicated to the FDA or HHS about veterans who were 
prescribed Paxil and later committed suicide, even though the FDA 
was actively investigating problems associated with this and other 
antidepressant drugs. Nor do I know whether staff investigated 
whether other veterans were being treated with Paxil with similar 
fatal effects. Once the claim became a federal lawsuit, government 
lawyers defending against the suit adopted an aggressive legalistic 
strategy, building on misplaced jurisdictional arguments about a 
widow’s representative capacity; the dispute’s potential for 
                                                     
149. Mader, 2008 WL 5111047, at *1.  
150. Id.
151. Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 131,
at 4-5.
152. Mader, 2008 WL 5111047, at *3, *5. 
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improving VA care took a back seat to the goal of defeating 
“unmerited damages.”153
B. Jurisdictional Exceptions: Information About Sexual Abuse in the 
Military 
This Section turns to cases that are dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds when the challenged conduct is held to be excluded from the 
government’s waiver of liability. As already discussed, the FTCA 
sets out thirteen such exclusions, and one specifically withholds 
jurisdiction from claims of assault and battery by federal officers.154
To these textual exclusions, the Supreme Court has added a 
fourteenth:155 claims by servicemembers for injuries that “arise out of 
or are in the course of activity incident to service,” a rule known 
eponymously as the Feres Doctrine156 and is related to, but distinct 
from, the statute’s textual exclusion of claims relating to combatant 
activities.157 Claims excluded by these exceptions cover a broad 
range of activity, touching almost every agency and every aspect of 
public life, large and small—embassy security,158 military base 
security,159 prison conditions,160 border patrol,161 agriculture and cattle 
                                                     
153. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
154. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2012). Importantly, the Court has resolved that the 
FTCA’s exception for assault-and-battery claims does not apply to “‘any cause of 
action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of 
medical . . . functions’” under the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089(e) (2012), and 
that a suit may be maintained alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting with 
the scope of his employment. Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1227, 1235 
(2013) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1089(e)).  
155. See 1 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 5A.01 
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2014) (1963) (“There is no provision in the Act expressly 
excluding or limiting the claims of servicemen. The Supreme Court, however, has 
construed the Act as containing both an exclusion and a limitation with regard to 
such claims.”).
156. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). 
158. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (barring 
negligence claims involving security provided by an independent contractor’s 
guards at the embassy). 
159. Latchum v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1222, 1231-32 (D. 
Haw. 2001), aff’d, 65 F. App’x 171 (9th Cir. 2003) (barring negligence claims 
arising out of a murder by a civilian of a servicemember while on a family vacation 
at an army recreational center). 
160. Bosworth v. United States, No. CV 14-0498 DMG (SS), 2014 WL 
2931164, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (barring a prisoner’s claim of sexual 
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herding,162 and postal service delivery.163 In particular, the combined 
effect of the exception for assault and battery with the Feres
Doctrine creates a toxic brew for claimants164—servicemembers,165
military spouses,166 military children,167 and civilians168—who allege 
claims of sexual abuse or rape by servicemembers or service-related 
personnel, such as healthcare workers,169 chaplains,170 and military 
                                                                                                               
battery by a prison correctional officer); Saunders v. United States, 502 F. Supp. 2d 
493, 495 (E.D. Va. 2007) (barring a negligence claim arising out of the assault of a 
prisoner who had told the Marshals Service he “feared for his safety”). 
161. Castro v. United States, 608 F.3d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 2010) (barring a 
claim that a border patrol’s negligence resulted in the erroneous deportation of a 
child). 
162. Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042, 1051 (8th Cir. 2013) (barring a 
claim that the government provided a toxic seeding plan that caused illness and 
death of the producers’ cattle).
163. Kuhner v. Montauk Post Office, No. 12-CV-2318 (JFB) (GRB), 2013 
WL 1343653, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013) (barring a claim of mail mis-delivery).  
164. See generally Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: Judicial Review of 
Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 723 (2013). 
165. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Air Force, 88 F. App’x 371 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(holding the Feres Doctrine barred a negligence claim by an Air Force 
servicemember arising from a rape that occurred in 1999 in military barracks); 
Zimmerman ex rel. Zimmerman v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298-99
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a claim by a military officer 
whose minor daughter was sexually assaulted by a fellow officer, but permitting the 
daughter’s claim of negligent child-abuse reporting to survive); Shiver v. United 
States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322 (D. Md. 1999) (dismissing an action “growing out of 
an alleged rape of the plaintiff that was committed by her then-drill sergeant while 
both of them were active-duty soldiers stationed at Aberdeen proving Ground”). 
166. See Cline v. United States, 13 F. Supp. 3d 868, 875 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) 
(dismissing a claim by a military spouse alleging that in 2008 the military 
negligently failed to warn her that her servicemember husband was forcibly raping 
and sodomizing plaintiff’s six-year-old daughter and videotaping such acts, and that 
he continued to do so after he returned from deployment in Iraq). 
167. See Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a negligent supervision claim brought on behalf 
of girls who in 1981 were sexually abused while hospitalized for ruptured 
appendixes at the United States Naval Hospital in Beaufort, South Carolina). 
168. See Malone v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382 (S.D. Ga. 
1999) (dismissing a civilian’s negligence claim arising from rape by a soldier who 
left the base in violation of his restricted status pending court martial for prior rape); 
Nanartonis v. United States, No. 85-4601-MA, 1986 WL 428, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 
27, 1986) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a sexual harassment claim brought by a 
woman who alleged sexual harassment in the form of “nonconsensual touching” 
during temporary employment as secretary at the Veterans Administration in 1983). 
169. See Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 393-94. 
170. See J.I. v. United States, No. C06-5674RJB, 2007 WL 2751597, at *1 
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2007) (denying without prejudice a motion to dismiss for 
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recruiters.171 In limited instances, some courts hold the matter to be 
within the government’s waiver of immunity if plaintiff can show a 
“special relationship” under state law that gives rise to a duty.172
Consider the failure-to-supervise claim at issue in Smith v. 
United States.173 In 1996, Sarah Smith, then an army private first 
class, spent the summer after her sophomore year in college 
attending Advanced Individual Training (AIT) at Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds, Maryland.174 On May 30, 1996—the second day of her 
training—Staff Sergeant Vernell Robinson Jr., the drill sergeant 
assigned to her platoon, allegedly entered Smith’s barracks 
unannounced and forcibly took her off-site to compel “non-
consensual intercourse and sodomy.”175 The complaint further 
alleged that throughout Smith’s training, the drill sergeant repeatedly 
forced her off-site to engage in nonconsensual and “various sex 
acts,” and that “other commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
were aware” of the drill sergeant’s “predatory behavior toward 
[Smith] and other female AIT trainees.”176 The complaint also 
alleged that “none of the officers who were aware of [the drill 
sergeant’s] acts ever reported them.”177 Smith timely presented her 
FTCA claim to the United States Army Claim Service “but never 
received a final disposition” within the statutory period and chose to 
                                                                                                               
lack of jurisdiction claim that Roman Catholic priests serving as chaplains in the 
United States Army Chaplain Corps sexually abused plaintiff as a minor, continued 
to do so “for several years,” and “made Plaintiff available to other employees of the 
Army, such as military aides and other chaplains”).
171. Verran v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 2d 765, 766-67 (E.D. Mich. 2004) 
(dismissing a claim of “brutal assault and rape” by United States Marine Corps 
recruiter).  
172. Compare id., with Mulloy v. United States, 937 F. Supp. 1001, 1009, 
1014 (D. Mass. 1996) (denying a summary judgment motion by the government of a 
claim of negligent hiring alleged by the estate of a service member’s spouse who 
was raped and killed by an enlistee, and finding “it was reasonably foreseeable that a 
convicted rapist and multiple felon would commit another crime of violence against 
a member of the military community were he permitted to enlist in the Army”), and
Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1988) (permitting a claim of 
negligent supervision on behalf of children molested by an unknown assailant at 
Scott Air Force Base Day Care Center because the government “allegedly left the 
children alone, neglecting its voluntarily assumed duty to watch and protect them”). 
173. 196 F.3d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1999).  
174. Id. at 775-76. 
175. Id. at 776. 
176. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 10, Smith, 196 F.3d 774 (No. 98-
CV-408-WDS). 
177. Smith, 196 F.3d at 776.  
Dismissed Federal-Tort Suits 221
file suit in federal court.178 The district court dismissed the suit, 
holding the claims were barred under the Feres Doctrine and the 
intentional-tort exception, and that the government did not have a 
special duty to protect Smith on which a negligent supervision claim 
could be based.179 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds: 
The allegations that the Army failed to control Staff Sergeant Robinson 
implicate important questions about the management of military personnel 
by those charged with that high responsibility. The wrongs allegedly 
perpetrated by Staff Sergeant Robinson upon then-Private First Class 
Smith were made possible by his status as her military superior. . . . 
Similarly, the claims that other officers failed to report Robinson’s
conduct implicate serious questions about the proper conduct and 
readiness of military units. . . . [T]he complaint clearly alleges that those 
superior to Staff Sergeant Robinson in the chain of command failed to 
prevent his abusing his military authority over Ms. Smith. This sort of 
allegation certainly is controlled by Feres.180
Plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari, which the Supreme Court 
denied in 2000.181
This narrative of events comes entirely from the published and 
unpublished court decisions in the Smith case. I do not know when 
Smith filed her administrative claim—only that it was timely. 
Newspaper stories and later legislative hearings provide additional 
detail. Smith reported her sexual abuse to supervisors in August 
1996, presumably before she filed her administrative claim. By the 
fall, Aberdeen Proving Ground had become synonymous with one of 
the worst sexual scandals in the military’s history and later was 
referred to as the “Army’s most devastating leadership failure[] since 
the Vietnam War.”182 Coming five years after the 1991 Tailhook 
convention—which riveted public attention on complaints that Navy 
and Marine aviators had sexually assaulted eighty-three women and 
seven men183—the Army is said to have acted quickly to investigate 
                                                     
178. Id.  
179. Id. at 775-76. 
180. Id. at 777-78. 
181. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 176. 
182. CLAUDIA J. KENNEDY WITH MALCOM MCCONNELL, GENERALLY 
SPEAKING: A MEMOIR BY THE FIRST WOMAN PROMOTED TO THREE-STAR GENERAL IN 
THE UNITED STATES ARMY 169 (2001). 
183. See Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military 
Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651, 657 & n.9 (1996) (citing INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., TAILHOOK 91, PART 2: EVENTS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL TAILHOOK SYMPOSIUM
VI-13 to VI-14 (1993)); see also Tim Weiner, The Navy Decides Not to Appeal 
Dismissals of Last Tailhook Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 1994), 
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Aberdeen’s alleged problems.184 On November 7, 1996, the Army 
announced that charges had been brought against two drill sergeants 
and a captain for raping or sexually harassing about a dozen female 
recruits.185 That same day, the Army set up a worldwide toll-free 
hotline to receive complaints about sexual abuse at any Army 
training site.186 At a news conference on November 12, the Secretary 
of the Army said, “[W]hen we punish, the word goes out.”187
Throughout the fall, recruits came forward with reports of sexual 
abuse by drill sergeants at Aberdeen,188 and eventually eleven drill 
sergeants were implicated.189 On January 30, 1997, the Army charged 
Staff Sergeant Robinson with nineteen criminal counts of rape, 
sodomy, and indecent assault involving one male and seven female 
trainees.190 Robinson was sentenced to a six-month prison sentence 
                                                                                                               
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/12/us/the-navy-decides-not-to-appeal-dismissals-
of-last-tailhook-cases.html (reporting that “the dismissal of the last three cases 
arising from the incident . . . means no one will ever be tried for harassing women at 
a bawdy aviators convention in 1991, despite the Navy’s acknowledgment that lewd 
behavior took place”). 
184. See Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, Army Heeds the Lessons of Tailhook: Quick 
Response Averts Suspicion of Cover-up, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 18, 1996), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-11-18/news/1996323087_1_aberdeen-tailhook 
-army-trainers (“The Army’s handling of the alleged sexual harassment of trainees 
at an Aberdeen Proving Ground school suggests it has learned from the Navy’s 
mistakes during the 1991 Tailhook scandal.”); see also Jennifer S. Knies, Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ’s Rape Law Missed the Mark, and 
How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put It Back on Target, ARMY LAW., Aug. 
2007, at 16 (describing the establishment of Aberdeen hotline); Michael I. Spak & 
Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: Time for a Change of 
Forum?, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 365-66 (1999) (describing the Tailhook and 
Aberdeen investigations).  
185. Jackie Spinner, In Wake of Sex Scandal, Caution Is the Rule at 
Aberdeen, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1997, at B01, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/aberdeen/caution.htm. 
186. See Alexander N. Pickands, Note, Reveille for Congress: A Challenge 
to Revise Rape Law in the Military, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2425, 2448 & n.100 
(2004) (explaining that given the role of service academies to train future officers, 
“[i]t is logical to assume that those leaders who would prey upon their peers at the 
academy would continue to abuse those over whom they exert control once they 
graduate”).
187. United States v. Ayers, 54 M.J. 85, 94 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
188. See Dana Michael Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One: Four 
Proposals to Combat Sexual Harassment in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
151, 159 (2007). 
189. Id.
190. See Scott Wilson, “The Game” Results in a Living Casualty: Sarah 
Smith Joined the Army Reserve to Help Pay for College. But When She Arrived at 
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and dishonorably discharged from the Army, but a rape charge in 
Smith’s case was dropped, and she was criticized for having delayed 
in reporting the abuse.191 A drill sergeant charged early in the Army’s 
investigation received a twenty-five year sentence in military prison 
and was released after serving fourteen years.192 Major Gen. Robert 
D. Shadley, commander of the Aberdeen training center, was the 
highest-ranking officer to be disciplined; he was transferred and 
received a reprimand, which later was challenged and removed.193
Critics of the Aberdeen prosecutions raised concerns that the Army 
was scapegoating African-American servicemen—all of the drill 
sergeants charged in the scandal were African-American194—in order 
“to conceal its own failure in policing mixed-gender training 
posts,”195 and that convening authorities wanted either “to stave off 
                                                                                                               
Aberdeen, She Says, She Was Raped Repeatedly by Her Drill Instructor, BALTIMORE 
SUN (Aug. 17, 1997), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-08-17/news/ 
1997229024_1_sarah-smith-aberdeen-army-sergeant.  
191. Id. (stating the judge was shocked by the sentence). For a criticism of 
the charges, see Brian C. Hayes, Strengthening Article 32 to Prevent Politically 
Motivated Prosecution: Moving Military Justice Back to the Cutting Edge, 19 
REGENT U. L. REV. 173, 189 (2006) (acknowledging a “gross breakdown in 
discipline at Aberdeen, as well as serious criminal behavior by some drill sergeants,” 
but questioning charges of rape against drill sergeants who were “at most guilty of 
fraternization, adultery, or disobeying orders”). 
192. See Jackie Spinner, The New Drill Sergeant, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 
1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local/longterm/library/aberdeen/ 
main.htm. 
193. See Jon Tevlin, Retired Minnesota General Not Surprised by Sex 
Assaults in Military, STAR TRIB. (May 28, 2013, 8:56 AM), 
http://www.startribune.com/local/209101451.html; Philip Shenon, General 
Reprimanded in Scandal at Base, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1997), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/11/us/general-reprimanded-in-scandal-at-base. 
html.  
194. See Carl Rochelle, Sergeant Accused in Aberdeen Sex Scandal Speaks 
Out, CNN (June 13, 1997, 12:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9706/ 
13/aberdeen.pentagon/ (quoting the charged drill sergeant stating that “‘no one other 
than men of color have been charged’”).
195. Scott Wilson, Aberdeen Sergeant Gets 25 Years: Jury’s Decision Fails 
to End Debate on Race, Sex, Power in Military, BALTIMORE SUN (May 7, 1997), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1997-05-07/news/1997127064_1_simpson-
aberdeen-sentence; see also Elaine Sciolino, Rape Witnesses Tell of Base Out of 
Control, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/15/us/rape-
witnesses-tell-of-base-out-of-control.html (stating that the trial testimony indicated 
that “the strict rules governing social behavior between the sexes apparently were 
broken and no one was held accountable”); Martha Chamallas, The New Gender 
Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L. REV. 305 (1998) 
(analyzing sex scandals in the military); cf. Lara A. Ballard, The Trial of Sergeant-
Major McKinney: An After Action Report, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 1 (2001) 
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criticism” or to avoid “closer scrutiny from Congress when 
considered for promotion or reassignment.”196
Smith’s federal-tort claim, alleging a failure to supervise that 
led to sexual assault and rape, was not unique. In 1999, a different 
district court easily dismissed another servicemember’s claim, also 
citing the Feres Doctrine: 
Under clear present law, the plaintiff’s FTCA claim is barred by the so-
called Feres doctrine, which embodies a judicially-recognized exception 
to the FTCA where the injury complained of was visited by one member 
of the armed forces upon another while both were in active service, 
whether on or off duty at the time the injury was inflicted. . . . Given the 
Supreme Court’s continuing adherence to the Feres doctrine, which 
obviously binds both the Fourth Circuit and this Court, this Court has no 
alternative but to dismiss the FTCA claim. This is not to suggest that the 
FTCA claim is within Rule 11 territory, as the Court is aware that Feres
is—and has been—under continual assault. But, it has withstood all 
challenges to date. Furthermore, to the extent that it could independently 
exercise its judgment on the issue, this Court would keep Feres intact and 
in place. The military services of this country cannot effectively be 
managed or deployed if subject to litigative hindsight by federal judges 
(there being no jury trials in FTCA cases), and, contrary to plaintiff’s
assertion, military discipline would be adversely affected by allowing tort 
litigation under the FTCA, as officers’ and non-commissioned officers’
authority and credibility would both be open to attack outside military 
channels, thus undermining their authority. The resulting fear of litigation 
would paralyze decision-making in the one segment of our society that 
remains free of such paralysis, and that must remain free of it, if it is to 
fulfill its mission. The point needs no more discussion than that.197
                                                                                                               
(discussing the 1998 conviction of Sergeant-Major McKinney, the first African-
American Sergeant-Major of the Army). 
196. Hayes, supra note 191, at 175-76.
197. Shiver v. United States, 34 F. Supp. 2d 321, 322 (D. Md. 1999); see 
also Henry Mark Holzer, The Endless Ordeals of Jacqueline Ortiz: A Desert Storm 
Soldier’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Recover for a Sexual Attack by Her First 
Sergeant, 24 N.M. L. REV. 51 (1994) (providing another example of a woman’s 
unsuccessful federal-tort claim resulting from sexual abuse in the Army). Contrary 
to the court’s suggestion in Shiver, the FTCA does not exclude all duty-to-supervise 
claims. The Supreme Court in Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988), held 
that the FTCA’s exclusion of liability for intentional torts does not encompass 
claims involving “foreseeably dangerous” acts that the government in some 
circumstances has a duty to prevent . Id. at 403. In this respect, the Court clarified 
that the earlier plurality opinion in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), 
which some lower courts mistakenly had applied to bar relief, did not control the 
result. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 408 (White, J., concurring).  
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The focus of this Article is not whether the Court ought to rethink the 
Feres Doctrine given the constraints of stare decisis.198 It is well 
known that the Feres Doctrine has strong critics199—notably Justice 
Scalia, whose dissent in United States v. Johnson,200 joined by Justice 
Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens, stated emphatically 
that “Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 
‘widespread, almost universal criticism’ it has received.”201 Lower 
courts feel bound to follow the doctrine,202 Congress so far has 
declined to abrogate it,203 and some commentators vigorously defend 
                                                     
198. See HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
ORDER CODE 95-717, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 8 (2007), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/DKesot/appendix-r-crs-report-to-congress-federal-tort-
claims-act-order-code-95-717 (speculating that “[a]s for the Supreme Court, it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that it could completely overrule Feres”). 
199. See Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the 
Retention of Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2003) (positing that Feres “was fundamentally flawed from its 
inception” and has contributed to a higher rate of malpractice and negligence in the 
military than in the civilian sector and to “the expansion of the military into 
collateral areas of governance”); Jennifer L. Zyznar, Comment, The Feres Doctrine: 
“Don’t Let This Be It. Fight!,” 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 611-12 (2013) (“Most 
service member claims die in judicial trenches only to be remembered by those 
personally affronted by the Feres Doctrine, a judicially created, and almost 
universally criticized, ‘exception’ to the FTCA.” (footnotes omitted)).
200. 481 U.S. 681, 692 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
201. Id. at 700-01 (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. 
Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). But see Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 
500, 510 (1988) (relying on federal common law rather than the Feres Doctrine to 
recognize a government contractor defense in tort suits). See David E. Seidelson, 
From Feres v. United States to Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: An 
Examination of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and a Couple of Suggestions, 32 DUQ.
L. REV. 219, 259-68 (1994) (discussing Boyle); Autumn Fox & Stephen R. 
McAllister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 275-82 (1997) (discussing Justice Scalia’s Johnson dissent). 
202. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC 
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 247 (1986) (discussing the district court’s reliance on the 
Feres Doctrine in the Agent Orange litigation).  
203. Writing in 1990, commentary emphasized that Congress for forty years 
had declined to abrogate Feres. See Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, 
The Feres Doctrine: Here Today—Gone Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990). 
For some time Congress has considered whether the Feres bar ought to be lifted for 
medical malpractice suits. See, e.g., Medical Malpractice Suits for Armed Services 
Personnel: Hearing on S. 2490 and H.R. 1054 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988); 
see also Melissa Feldmeier, Comment, At War with the Feres Doctrine: The 
Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical Accountability Act of 2009, 60 CATH. U. L.
REV. 145 (2010) (discussing the proposed Carmelo Rodriguez Military Medical 
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Feres as essential to military discipline.204 Congress has held 
hearings to inquire into the doctrine;205 my suggestion is that those 
oversight efforts need to be regular and broader in focus, and ought 
to consider whether allegations set out in FTCA suits that do not 
survive jurisdictional motions require further investigation. Twenty 
years after Smith’s summer training at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
sexual abuse in the military is back in the news again—fueled by the 
Defense Department’s annual reports to Congress that show a surge 
in reported and unreported claims of sexual abuse.206 The 2013 report 
indicated that in fiscal year 2012, reported assaults rose 6% to 3,374, 
but that the number of servicemembers who reported abuse and 
never filed a claim rose from 19,000 the prior year to 26,000.207
Numbers are even higher in the 2014 report: Reported assaults rose 
to 5,061, with 54% attributing the abuse to another service 
member.208 With popular culture highlighting the problem in the form 
                                                                                                               
Accountability Act of 2009, which would permit service members to recover for 
medical and dental malpractice claims for non-combat related injuries or deaths). 
204. See generally Paul Figley, In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned 
Opinion, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 393 (2010); Joan M. Bernott, Fairness and Feres: A 
Critique of the Presumption of Injustice, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51 (1987). 
205. See, e.g., The Feres Doctrine: An Examination of this Military 
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002).  
206. See Craig Whitlock, Fresh Reports of Sexual Misconduct Undercut 
Pentagon’s Argument for Internal Fix, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fresh-reports-of-sexual-
misconduct-undercut-pentagons-argument-for-internal-fix/2014/04/24/8c3eae20-
cbce-11e3-93eb-6c0037dde2ad_story.html (discussing “fresh reports of senior 
commanders bungling cases or coming under investigation themselves”).
207. See Helene Cooper, Pentagon Study Finds 50% Increase in Reports of 
Military Sexual Assaults, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/05/02/us/military-sex-assault-report.html (stating that the report “immediately 
came under fire for what critics said were significant limitations”); Courtney Kube 
& Jim Miklaszewski, Pentagon’s Annual Report on Sexual Assault Shows Alarming 
Rise, NBC NEWS (May 6, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/ 
2013/05/06/18090415-pentagons-annual-report-on-sexual-assault-shows-alarming-
rise?lite (“Embarrassingly, the report is being made public just a day after it was 
revealed that the Air Force’s sexual-abuse prevention chief has himself been 
charged with sexual assault.”). 
208. See Craig Whitlock, Pentagon Sees Surge in Reports of Sexual Assault 
Among Service Members, WASH. POST (May 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/national-security/pentagon-sees-surge-in-reports-of-sexual-assault-
among-service-members/2014/05/01/0f18515e-d14a-11e3-9e25-188ebe1fa93b_ 
story.html (“‘We have a long way to go in solving this problem . . . .’” (quoting 
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel)). 
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of TV dramas,209 documentaries,210 self-published military 
memoirs,211 and articles in Vogue,212 the last year has seen an intense 
but unsuccessful effort among some elected representatives to 
remove sexual abuse claims from the chain of command and to place 
them under civilian review.213 My point in highlighting the Smith
                                                     
209. The TV show House of Cards incorporated into its plot line a brochure 
from a training center in South Carolina advising the victims of sexual abuse that 
“‘[i]f you are attacked, it may be advisable to submit than to resist.’” See Anna 
Palmer, Juana Summers & Darren Samuelsohn, When a Scandal Becomes a Cause,
POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/military-
sexual-assault-kirsten-gillibrand-104387.html. 
210. The Invisible War: Filmmakers, INVISIBLEWARMOVIE.COM (2012), 
http://invisiblewarmovie.com/filmmakers.php. 
211. See ROBERT D. SHADLEY, THE GAME: UNRAVELING A MILITARY SEX 
SCANDAL (2013); see also Bryna Zumer, Retired APG General: The Players 
Change, the ‘GAM’ Remains the Same, BALTIMORE SUN (May 23, 2013, 6:05 AM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/harford/aberdeen-havre-de-grace/ph-
ag-military-scandal-0524-20130522,0,1253262.story (reporting on the Aberdeen 
commander the recounting investigation and expressing his view that the problem 
has not been solved). GAM refers to “‘game a la military,’ in which drill sergeants 
had a contest to see who could sleep with the most trainees.” Zumer, supra. 
212. See Mimi Swartz, Sexual Misconduct in the Military—and Why Kirsten 
Gillibrand Is Pushing Reform to the Top of Her Agenda, VOGUE (Feb. 21, 2014, 
5:48 PM), http://www.vogue.com/magazine/article/kirsten-gillibrand-calls-for-
reform-after-reports-of-military-rape-and-misconduct/#1 (discussing Senator 
Gillibrand’s evolving recognition of the problem of sexual abuse in the military).
213. See Military Justice Improvement Act of 2013, S. 967, 113th Cong. The 
bill failed to overcome a filibuster. See Helene Cooper, Senate Rejects Blocking 
Military Commanders from Sex Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A11, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/us/politics/military-sexual-assault-
legislation.html; see also Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 370-71, 375, 377 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (dismissing a Bivens action against current and former Secretaries of Defense 
by “current or former members of the United States Navy and Marine Corps who 
allege that they were raped, sexually assaulted, or sexually harassed by their fellow 
Sailors and Marines, only to suffer retaliation from their superiors for reporting their 
plight”). In support of its view that judicial intervention was not warranted, the 
appeals court stated, “Congress [has been] no idle bystander to th[e] debate” about 
sexual assault in the military. Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 551 (4th Cir. 
2012). The four most recent National Defense Authorization Acts have each 
included numerous provisions aimed at combating this scourge. See National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, §§ 1701-1753, 
127 Stat. 672, 950-85 (2013); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, §§ 570-579, 126 Stat. 1632, 1752-64; National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 581-586, 125 Stat. 
1298, 1430-36 (2011); Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §§ 1601-1632, 124 Stat. 4137, 4429-36. The 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 appropriated $25 million for the 
Department of Defense to implement a Sexual Assault Special Victims Program. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 8124, 128 Stat. 5, 
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case is to underscore the importance of consistent and regular 
follow-up, even of dismissed FTCA claims, to ensure that agency 
errors—in training, supervision, processing, and provision of 
services—are not repeated because allowed to go uncorrected. 
III. OVERSIGHT AND OVERSEERS
Public accountability for government performance is said to be 
“a cornerstone of democratic governance.”214 One aspect of 
accountability is the responsiveness of government officials to 
problems that require review and revision.215 This Part offers the 
practical suggestion of having Congress use judicially barred FTCA 
suits as an oversight tool to improve agency performance. The 
proposal is not intended to supplant the FTCA’s tort remedy—
which, in any event, is not available for broad categories of 
government misconduct because of the statute’s jurisdictional 
exceptions216—but instead recognizes that the institutional mix of 
incentives can usefully include political and third-party mechanisms 
to motivate agency conduct.217 I justify enhanced congressional 
oversight from the perspective of enriching institutional competence, 
encouraging deterrence, and supporting constituent service, and then 
suggest ways to operationalize the proposal, building on existing 
mediating structures that avoid trenching on legislative prerogative.  
                                                                                                               
133 (2014). And Congress is currently debating further legislation on the issue. See
Victims Protection Act of 2014, S. 1917, 113th Cong.; Ed O’Keefe, Senate Easily
Passes McCaskill’s Military Sexual Assault Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/10/senate-easily-
passes-mccaskills-military-sexual-assault-bill/. 
214. Peter J. May, Regulatory Regimes and Accountability, 1 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 8, 11 (2007). Exactly what the cornerstone entails is open to question. 
See ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2001) (quoting 
authors variously calling the concept of accountability “‘fundamental but 
underdeveloped’”; “‘murky’”; a “‘will-o-the wisp’”; and “‘always changing’”).
215. See, e.g., Richard Mulgan, “Accountability”: An Ever-Expanding 
Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 566 (2000) (identifying accountability with 
responsiveness). 
216. See FIGLEY, supra note 37, at 12-19.
217. For a typology of accountability mechanisms, see Barbara S. Romzek & 
Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons from the 
Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 229 (1987) (identifying internal 
mechanisms that are bureaucratic and professional and external mechanisms that are 
legal and political). See generally Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? 
Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013) 
(discussing the role of inspectors general in the field of national security even after 
courts have rejected claims). 
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A. Leveraging FTCA Suits to Improve Congressional Activity 
As is frequently noted, Congress carries out a number of 
different, overlapping functions. Legislators undertake policy 
making, engage in oversight, and offer constituent service. Inviting 
Congress to consider and review dismissed FTCA suits enhances 
each of these functions and is consistent with the design and purpose 
of the FTCA itself. 
1. Policy Making: Information and Institutional Competence 
The FTCA lifts the government’s immunity from suit for the 
negligent torts of its employees but leaves broad areas of government 
conduct free from judicial oversight.218 One justification for the 
location of this line between political discretion and judicial review 
draws from separation of powers and the view that Congress is the 
branch of government best equipped for policy making. This 
legislative advantage often is associated with a superior capacity to 
investigate problems, to gather together facts, and to adapt solutions 
in response to plural interests and competing preferences.219 FTCA 
complaints, even if dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional 
grounds, offer Congress a pool of information that can enhance 
policy making by equipping lawmakers and their staff details and 
insights about agency performance that may not be forthcoming from 
other sources. Congress already holds hearings about particular 
FTCA doctrines;220 the current proposal simply enlarges the focus. 
Commentators already recognize that judicial opinions offer 
Congress information and provide an important window into agency 
activity.221 But it is well acknowledged that Congress does not 
routinely read the federal reporters, and certainly does not troll 
unpublished decisions, other than when advocacy groups rally 
around particular decisions and lobby for legislative reform.222
                                                     
218. See FIGLEY, supra note 37, at 12-19.
219. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: 
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1882-84 (2001) 
(discussing the presumed superior capacity of legislators to investigate problems and 
devise policies). 
220. See supra text accompanying note 205. 
221. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
222. Cf. Frank Burk, Statutory Housekeeping: A Senate Perspective, 85 GEO.
L.J. 2217, 2217 (1997) (reporting that the Governance Institute’s pilot project for 
statutory housekeeping has resulted in “varied” responses from the legislative 
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However clear an opinion’s message—about a gap in the statute, an 
unintended consequence of legislative drafting, or a provision’s lack 
of clarity—the signal is lost if it is not transmitted to Congress for 
follow-up action. Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier and Michael J. 
Remington thus have observed: 
Judges often write opinions finding that a statute is constitutional but not 
well drafted, in that the statutory language does not achieve ostensible 
policy purposes. The judge notes, unhappily, that a correction of the 
statute is strictly within the province of the legislature. The opinion is then 
shared with the litigants, and often sent for publication in the proper 
reporter. Congress never hears about the opinion. A failure to 
communicate stifles the movement of an idea at its birth.223
To overcome this information barrier, the Governance Institute 
established a pilot project, later expanded, aimed at transmitting to 
Congress any judicial decision that identified a statute with textual 
problems that seemed to require review and possible revision.224
Decisions that dismiss FTCA claims on jurisdictional or 
procedural grounds likewise warrant legislative attention but are 
even less likely to receive congressional attention. First, judicially 
barred federal-tort claims typically have low salience and do not 
attract attention from the media or the academy, which conceivably 
could trigger congressional focus. The decisions concern an 
individual, and not a class action; they do not involve constitutional 
issues; they usually do not set out an innovative statutory 
interpretation; and their procedural and jurisdictional explanation 
may make for dull reading that obscures what is really at stake in the 
case.225
Second, these decisions emit signals about agency action that 
are harder to decipher than an opinion identifying a one-off problem 
                                                                                                               
committees involved and that “[s]ome committees make better use of the cases 
transmitted than others”).
223. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, A Judicious 
Legislator’s Lexicon to the Federal Judiciary, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY, supra note 35, at 82-83. 
224. See Katzmann & Herseth, supra note 41, at 2190. 
225. Even decisions of high salience often do not attract sustained 
congressional attention. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing 
Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 
(1995) (discussing the unwillingness of Congress to overturn court decisions). Of 
course there are exceptions. The Office of General Counsel of the House of 
Representatives lists a half dozen FTCA cases on its website, although the decisions 
pertain largely to constitutional torts and not pure FTCA claims. See Federal Tort 
Claims Act, OFF. GEN. COUNS., http://www.ogc.house.gov/legislation/federal-tort-
claims-act.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
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of grammar in a legislative text. Sometimes—as with the Smith sex-
abuse case alleging inadequate training and supervision of 
subordinate personnel—the reader has to look closely at the facts in a 
number of similar cases involving the same agency or regional 
division of an agency to begin to see patterns or recurring themes. 
Similarly, suits alleging medical malpractice that are dismissed for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies that involve the same 
federally supported hospital or attending healthcare workers 
potentially offer important information about agency performance 
that is obscured from view. These decisions offer hints, suggest 
clues, and provide dots that need to be connected—requiring not 
only the kind of factual investigation for which Congress is 
institutionally suited, but also Congress’s clear understanding of how 
to read a judicial decision so that merits issues are not conflated with 
jurisdiction and other procedural grounds. 
Finally, the fact that the court has not ordered relief for the 
claimant—indeed, has barred the claimant from federal court—could 
mistakenly be interpreted as ratification of the agency’s action or as 
an indication that additional oversight is not needed. To the contrary, 
a case that is dismissed on procedural or jurisdictional grounds is not 
filtered through the lens of judicial review; the court has focused not 
on the merits of the agency’s performance, but only on whether the 
claimant has met threshold conditions needed to invoke judicial 
power. The FTCA immunizes a great deal of agency misconduct—
intentional torts, discretionary decisions, and so forth—and for that 
reason the agency’s alleged misconduct may not be subject to 
judicial scrutiny. Once the case has been dismissed, all that remains 
of the allegations is the claimant’s account of his injury, which is 
likely to be pushed out of view and disregarded as biased and 
unreliable. 
Consider an example: A recurring legal question in FTCA 
litigation is whether a claim is presented for the purpose of 
administrative exhaustion if the complaint states a theory of liability 
that was not included in the initial written statement to the agency. 
Initially, some courts took the view that presentment was satisfied if 
the agency had notice of the negligence claim;226 others did not even 
require that the administrative claimant specify a legal theory of 
                                                     
226. See, e.g., Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494-95 (11th Cir. 1983). 
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liability.227 However, later courts have imposed strict particularity 
requirements on the presenting of administrative claims, holding, for 
example, that a negligence claim presented to the agency is not 
sufficient to permit a lawsuit on a theory of informed consent.228 In 
cases dismissed on this ground, the agency—typically the VA or a 
federal community medical facility—has not denied that it provided 
treatment without the patient’s informed consent, but the court has 
not reached the merits of the question.229 Quite apart from whether 
the courts are interpreting the statute correctly, the decisions warrant 
a second look: Some kind of after-action report is needed for 
Congress to have a better sense of how health care is being delivered 
at federally supported facilities. Failing to secure informed consent 
before providing medical treatment, if a sustained practice, seems a 
serious lapse in professional standards that ought to be investigated 
and corrected—even if particular victims of the practice are not 
eligible for judicially ordered damages. At least one court of appeals, 
denying relief on jurisdictional grounds in a suit alleging a lack of
informed medical consent, acknowledged the “tragic circumstances” 
of the case, but held that its hands were tied given the presentment 
requirement that it believed only Congress could amend.230 Yet a
complaint alleging a hospital’s failure to secure informed consent 
could signal an even deeper problem, as lawsuits pertaining to illegal 
medical experimentation sadly illustrate.231
2. Agency Performance: Information and Deterrence  
The proposal also supports efforts to deter agency misconduct 
and to ensure that federal employees conform to professional 
                                                     
227. See, e.g., Mellor v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 641, 642 (D. Utah 1978) 
(stating that an administrative claim for the purpose of presentment is not the same 
as a cause of action). 
228. Compare Staggs v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 425 F.3d 881, 885 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an administrative claim for 
medical malpractice does not necessarily include informed consent), with Frantz v. 
United States, 29 F.3d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1994) (taking the contrary position). 
229. Staggs, 425 F.3d at 883-85. 
230. Id. at 885. 
231. See Keri D. Brown, Comment, An Ethical Obligation to Our 
Servicemembers: Meaningful Benefits for Informed Consent Violations, 47 S. TEX.
L. REV. 919 (2006) (discussing medical experiments conducted on service members 
without informed consent and the dismissal of FTCA cases filed on this theory); see, 
e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (dismissing an FTCA claim on 
behalf of service member subjected without consent to medical experimentation 
involving the drug LSD). 
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expectations. Congressional oversight involves “whether, to what 
extent, and in what way Congress attempts to detect and remedy 
executive-branch violations of legislative goals.”232 Ensuring that 
agencies stay within the range of public expectations is a feature of 
accountability even if the conduct is not subject to judicial 
sanction.233 These expectations cover a great deal of ground—
financial regularity, fairness, abuse of power, and performance.234
Performance may be measured directly through the use of outcome 
standards that determine post hoc whether an agency has met 
program requirements.235 Performance may be measured indirectly 
through the use of tort suits that impose damages when service 
delivery or other agency conduct has not met the requisite 
standards.236 The FTCA makes use of this latter form of 
accountability measure: Relief under the FTCA consists of the 
payment of damage awards to injured parties.237 Tort theory assumes 
that basic make-whole awards not only compensate victims for 
injury but also motivate the tortfeasor to engage in optimal 
deterrence to improve performance in the future. Whether or not the 
government responds to financial incentives,238 incentives of this sort 
generally are not present in the FTCA context because judgments 
(other than those below $2,500) are not charged against the agency’s 
budget, and the individual employee is absolutely immune from suit 
if the tortious conduct occurred in the course of employment.239
Additional mechanisms therefore are needed to motivate agency 
                                                     
232. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 
165 (1984). 
233. See BEHN, supra note 214, at 6 (“Certainly government does have some 
clear responsibilities, and we citizens expect that our government will fulfill them. 
We are concerned about the responsibilities, obligations, and duties of public 
agencies and public officials. We are concerned about how these agencies and 
officials carry out these responsibilities, obligations, and duties. We expect that 
these agencies and officials will preserve, earn, and build the public’s trust while 
fulfilling the public interest.”).
234. Id. at 6-9 (identifying these different types of expectations as informing 
notions of public accountability). 
235. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 232, at 166. 
236. See id.
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
238. See supra note 34. 
239. An exception is for judgments, awards, and settlement pertaining to 
anti-discrimination laws and whistleblower suits. See Notification and Federal 
Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-174, 116 
Stat. 566; see also Anderson & Roberts, supra note 23, at 10. 
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behavior to ensure compliance with legal and professional norms. A 
judicially barred suit effectively escapes review on the merits, so the 
court cannot serve this oversight function. 
In other contexts, commentators have acknowledged the 
importance of redundancy—using multiple and sometimes 
overlapping compliance methods—to encourage agency 
accountability.240 With respect to the FTCA, damage awards serve 
goals that differ from those of congressional oversight: The former 
compensates the victim for injuries and perhaps has deterrent effects 
that affect future conduct; congressional oversight of the sort I am 
proposing retrospectively assesses incidents of alleged negligence to 
assess whether further investigation and revision of agency conduct 
might be needed. The two forms of relief express different (although 
related) normative values. Damage awards, while reducing injury to 
monetized form, embrace a dignitary aspect that is personal to the 
injured party; congressional oversight functions collectively and 
aims at institutional reform (although, as the next section discusses, 
it also can serve individual goals associated with constituent service). 
Finally, redundancy is useful when there is the possibility—as in the 
FTCA administrative claims process—that information will be 
hidden by one accountability mechanism but uncovered through the 
use of a complementary mechanism.241
3. Constituent Service: Information and Private Bills 
So far I have justified the proposal as promoting accountability 
by monitoring performance and motivating agency improvement. 
The proposal can be expected to promote analogous benefits of 
responsiveness and deterrence for lawmakers; dismissed FTCA 
decisions can alert Congress to constituent concerns and encourage 
Congress to undertake reforms. Indeed, the proposal has a direct and 
positive link to Congress’s role in providing old-fashioned 
constituent service—the “pork and potholes” of traditional politics.242
                                                     
240. On the value of redundancy as an accountability mechanism, see Colin 
Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 38, 52 (2000) 
(referring to redundancy as the use of “overlapping (and ostensibly superfluous) 
accountability mechanisms [that] reduce the centrality of any one of them”).
241. Id. at 52-53.
242. See Joshua Bone, Stop Ignoring Pork and Potholes: Election Law and 
Constituent Service, 123 YALE L.J. 1406 (2013); see also Heinz Eulau & Paul D. 
Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness, 2
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233, 241 (1977) (identifying constituent service, resource 
allocation, and symbolic activities as entailments of representation). 
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It is not unusual for legislators to serve in an “ombuds” role, 
intermediating relations between a constituent and an agency.243
Often this kind of constituent service takes the form of case review, 
which operates ex ante, before the agency has reached its decision. 
The proposal enhances the legislator’s ombuds role, but does so ex 
post, after the agency and court have dismissed the constituent’s 
claim. Because the dismissal bars the claim “forever,” the legislator 
cannot directly revisit the decision—Congress has no authority to 
revise a judgment once it has been entered by the court.244 But the 
proposal could encourage Congress to be proactive—to be alert to 
“the next case” and to ensure staff intervention before the claim is 
judicially barred.245 Moreover, the review of multiple dismissals 
could provide the basis for policy reform.246 Far from detracting from 
Congress’s more important substantive role in formulating policy,247
                                                     
243. See JOHN R. JOHANNES, TO SERVE THE PEOPLE: CONGRESS AND 
CONSTITUENCY SERVICE 3 (1984) (defining the ombuds-function as an 
“intermediary” between the constituent and the agency).
244. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225-30 (1995). 
245. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression: Its Causes 
and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 291, 345-46 (2012) (recommending a 
“collaborative monitor” to improve government action). It is not unusual for ombuds 
offices to make use of complaints—whether legally based or not—as a source of 
information about agency performance. For example, the Federal Trade Commission 
maintains a “Consumer Sentinel” database that marshals together consumer 
complaints that are filed through a hotline and online about debt collection. The 
complaints typically deal with particular collection companies or individuals and 
provide the FTC with an important source of information about possible legal 
violations and targets for investigation. Some of the complaints do not rise to the 
level of a legal claim, and they include no responsive materials from the collection 
company. Nevertheless, the FTC regards the consumer-complaint data as important 
for spotting trends when enforcement actions might be appropriate and has made 
this information available to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for oversight 
of the debt-collection industry and rule-making activity. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2014
(2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_fair-debt-
collection-practices-act.pdf; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER 
RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT: JANUARY 1 – DECEMBER 31, 2013 (2014), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/reports/2013-consumer-response-annual-report/ 
(discussing collection and review of debt-collection complaints). 
246. See Bone, supra note 242, at 1414 (stating that case work can provide 
representatives “[w]ith accurate and timely information,” and “agencies rely on 
representatives and their casework teams to provide informed feedback on agency 
service provision”); see also Larry P. Ortiz et al., Legislative Casework: Where 
Policy and Practice Intersect, 31 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 49, 53 (2004) (observing 
that casework can result in legislative reform). 
247. Cf. Joseph Cooper, Foreword: Strengthening the Congress: An 
Organizational Analysis, 12 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 321 (1975) (stating the view 
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the proposal could inform that work, operating as a form of fire-
alarm oversight that is typical of constituent service.248
B.  Information Transmission and Second Looks 
The previous Parts have referred metaphorically to dismissed 
FTCA cases as “early warnings” and “thirteenth chimes” to suggest 
their usefulness to Congress in its policy making, oversight, and 
constituent-service functions. To these metaphors, we can add 
another: “tip of the spear”—a term drawn from the Center for Law 
and Military Operation’s publication of military after-action 
reports.249 After-action reports, now pervasive throughout 
government, industry, and social psychology, are a well-known 
feature of military culture.250 An after-action report functions as an 
internal management tool that enables participants to review an 
event, to assess practices that worked well and those that did not, and 
to consider whether different approaches ought to be utilized to 
improve performance in future activities.251 In recommending that 
lawyers conduct after-action reviews of trials, a team of 
commentators has explained: 
                                                                                                               
that “time spent on constituency service . . . can seriously detract from committee 
work”).
248. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 232, at 173 (discussing 
constituent service activities as a form of oversight). 
249. See Ctr. for Law & Military Operations, CLAMO Publishes New Tip of 
the Spear and Domestic Operational Law Handbook, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2010, at 1. 
250. See Victor M. Hansen, Developing Empirical Methodologies to Study 
Law of War Violations, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 342, 379 (2008) 
(“Perhaps one of the most useful avenues of exploration for the empirical researcher 
is to examine how the military itself examines its past conduct, identifies 
deficiencies and what steps it takes to correct those deficiencies. An important part 
of the military culture is this process of reviewing past actions as a means of 
improving future performance. A routine part of a military operation, from squad-
level engagements to large-scale actions, is the After Action Review, where 
members of the unit examine and analyze what went well and what could be 
improved. The military services also examine and memorialize much of this 
information in a more formalized and systematic way. For example, the Army has 
created the Center for Army Lessons Learned. This center is based at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. Its stated mission is to collect and analyze data from a variety 
of current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events and 
produce lessons for military commanders, staff and students.” (footnotes omitted)).
251. See id.; see also Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful 
Policing, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 79 (2004) (discussing after-
action reports as a managerial strategy). 
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An after action review . . . forces the entire trial team to review and 
critique the significant events leading up to trial as well as each of the 
trial’s segments. Army generals as far back as Caesar in his 
“Commentaries on the Gallic War” have learned strategic and tactical 
lessons through after action reports. Today, state agencies and most major 
corporations engage in after action reviews in evaluating projects.252
After-action review thus occasions a “second look” at an entity’s 
conduct with the goal of motivating clearheaded criticism to improve 
future performance. 
The proposal urges Congress to take a “second look” at agency 
performance through the lens of dismissed FTCA cases. I do not 
think a new institutional mechanism is needed to operationalize the 
proposal, but it does require effort, focus, and political will. 
Lawmakers cannot be ordered to take these steps, which could 
include amending the FTCA (among, other things, to require agency 
reporting)—but their sincere commitment to the issues and to their 
constituents must provide the motivation. First, congressional staff, 
as a part of their constituent-service activities, could routinely review 
dismissed FTCA suits of plaintiffs within their districts. Second, 
Congress may enlist the General Accountability Office and the 
Congressional Research Office to study judicially barred suits on a 
systematic basis. Third, the Administrative Conference could 
undertake a special project that focuses on agency investigation of 
federal-tort claims with the possibility of improving intra- and inter-
agency communication about shared institutional problems. 
1. Lawmakers and Staff 
The constituent-service function of lawmakers comfortably 
embraces the review of dismissed FTCA suits. Of course, 
congressional staff do not have unlimited resources, and they tend to 
be generalists, so the prospect of reviewing something that sounds as 
esoteric as dismissed FTCA decisions may be rejected at the starting 
                                                     
252. J. Ric Gass & Michael B. Brennan, What Went Right, or Wrong: Trial 
“After Action Reviews,” FOR DEFENSE, Aug. 2013, at 28, 29, available at
http://www.gasswebermullins.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/FTD-1308-Gass 
Brennan.pdf (citation omitted) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, A LEADER’S GUIDE 
TO AFTER-ACTION REVIEWS, TRAINING CIRCULAR NO. 25-20, at 1 (1993), available 
at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/Files/Topical/After_Action_Report/ 
resources/tc25-20.pdf; CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8607(f) (West 2013) (mandating 
California Emergency Management Agency after action reviews 120 days after 
declared disasters); After Action Review, KSTOOLKIT, http://www.kstoolkit.org/ 
After+Action+Review (last visited Jan. 26, 2015)). 
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gate.253 Congress does not routinely receive or review court decisions 
that dismiss FTCA suits or order relief in such cases. Nor do 
agencies routinely provide information about claim settlements or 
denials.254 The 1946 version of the FTCA obligated the head of every 
agency to “report annually to Congress all claims paid by it under”
the act, “stating the name of each claimant, the amount claimed, the 
amount awarded, and a brief description of the claim,”255 but a 1965 
amendment repealed the requirement, although specific agencies do 
make periodic reports to Congress about paid claims.256
On the other hand, lawmakers and staff, as public choice 
theorists emphasize, are oriented to constituent service,257 and the 
proposal builds on that aspect of the lawmaker’s job. Indeed, it is 
precisely because legislators have limited time and cannot “supervise 
every regulatory development” that the proposal warrants 
consideration; sometimes looking indirectly at a situation, mining 
unfamiliar sources of information, or seeing a situation when it is not 
primed for review offers a useful and even better way to focus 
attention and to gain insight into performance and outcomes.258
Finally, constituent service often involves congressional action on 
behalf of lower-income individuals, which would be consistent with 
the presumed universe of defeated FTCA claimants. On the other 
hand, the services provided would be nonpartisan in scope and 
impact.259
2. General Accountability Office  
It also may be useful to enlist a third-party overseer that is 
perceived as neutral, independent, and nonpartisan. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) provides another pathway through 
                                                     
253. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: 
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 
1933, 1959 (2008) (discussing these features of congressional staff). 
254. See Bermann, supra note 31, at 654. 
255. 28 U.S.C. § 2673 (Supp. V 1946). 
256. Act of Nov. 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-348(1), 79 Stat. 1310. For a 
discussion, see Bermann, supra note 31, at 654. 
257. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 253, at 1959. 
258. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 420 n.31 (2005). 
259. See Bone, supra note 242, at 1414 n.28 (“Unsurprisingly, political 
scientists have determined that the likelihood of making a casework request 
generally decreases as education level increases, though the likelihood ticks up again 
for the most educated.”). 
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which information about dismissed FTCA claims can be 
communicated to Congress.260 The GAO “is the audit and evaluation 
agency for” Congress.261 It was founded by the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921 in order to investigate the use of public 
funds and to make recommendations to the executive and legislative 
branches on how to improve the country’s financial management.262
During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress expanded the GAO’s 
authority by calling on it to study “the economy and efficiency of 
government operations.”263 In the 1970s and 1980s, the GAO 
furthered its program evaluation mandate by diversifying its 
researchers to include staff from different professions.264 In 2004, the 
Government Accounting Office changed its name to the Government 
Accountability Office in order to reflect its expanded mandate.265 The 
GAO examines the day-to-day operations of different parts of the 
government but also studies larger issues that the country faces, such 
as the government’s overall financial health and military 
engagements.266
The GAO’s website describes its current mission as supporting 
“Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help 
improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal 
government [and providing] Congress with timely information that is 
objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and 
balanced.”267 The GAO’s structure is designed to promote neutrality 
in the research that its staff undertakes.268 While the Comptroller 
                                                     
260. See Bermann, supra note 31, at 654. 
261. Nancy Kingsbury, The Government Accountability Office and 
Congressional Uses of Federal Statistics, 631 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
43, 43 (2010).  
262. Id. at 44. 
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What’s in a Name?,
ROLL CALL (July 19, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/ 
50_8/guest/6262-1.html. 
266. Id.
267. See About GAO, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
268. See How the Comptroller General Is Selected, GAO,
http://www.gao.gov/about/cgprocess.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). The GAO Act 
of 1980 established the current procedure for appointing the Comptroller General of 
the United States who heads the GAO. Id. A congressional commission first 
provides the President with a list of at least three individuals to replace the outgoing 
Comptroller General. Id. The President then chooses someone from the list to be 
nominated, who must be approved by the Senate. Id. The Comptroller General of the 
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General authorizes parts of the research agenda, the GAO’s work is 
mainly undertaken at the request of congressional committees or by 
mandates in laws or committee reports.269 The GAO currently issues 
about 1,200 reports annually.270 In creating its reports, the GAO 
relies on statistical data from many agencies, including the Census 
Bureau, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and the National Center for Educational Statistics.271
At the request of Congress, the GAO already has undertaken 
excellent analyses of paid FTCA claims by the VA on the view that 
that they offer a synoptic account of service delivery at medical 
facilities for veterans. In 1995, the GAO reported on medical 
malpractice claims filed against the VA explaining that they 
“provided opportunities for VA to identify concerns with individual 
providers and decrease the risk of future tort claims.”272 The GAO 
did a second study in 2011, examining “the resolution of tort claims 
filed against VA in the context of VA’s efforts to improve the quality 
of veterans’ care at its facilities.”273 FTCA suits that were not paid—
because of procedural defects, lapsed statutes of limitations, or 
filings in the wrong court—were not included in the analysis,274 and 
if examined likely would have highlighted deeper and broader 
problems.  
                                                                                                               
United States is appointed for a fifteen-year term and may only be removed by 
Congress. Id.
269. About GAO, supra note 267. 
270. Kingsbury, supra note 261, at 44. 
271. Id. at 45-46.
272. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 2. 
273. Id. The GAO studies focused on claims in the period from 2005 to 
2010. Id. at 3. Twenty-five percent of the tort claims that went to litigation were 
dismissed before trial; of the cases resolved through judgment, the GAO found that 
“the vast majority were resolved in favor of the United States.” Id. at 8. The Office 
of Medical-Legal Affairs is required to review all paid claims—whether resolved 
administratively or through litigation—to determine whether VA practitioners 
delivered substandard care to veterans. Id. at 2. However, the GAO found that 16% 
of paid claims during this period had not been transmitted to OMLA for review, and 
that as a result, 140 healthcare “practitioners would likely have been required to be 
reported . . . for rendering substandard care.” Id. at 13. The GAO emphasized that 
analysis of paid claims is an important part of the VA’s quality-control process. Id.
at 14. The GAO further reported that “positive changes” could result from timely 
review of “[w]hen allegations of substandard case are first brought to the attention 
of VHA management officials (either when the incident occurred or when the tort 
claim is filed).” Id. at 18. 
274. Id. at 9 n.a. 
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3. Congressional Research Service  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is another third-
party overseer that could be enlisted to undertake review of 
dismissed FTCA claims and to report findings to Congress. In 
contrast to the GAO, its communications with Congress are 
confidential.275 The CRS was established in 1914 as a separate 
department within the Library of Congress and originally was called 
the Legislative Reference Service.276 Under the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970, the agency acquired its current name, 
and its duties were expanded.277 The CRS serves as a think tank for 
Congress and prepares reports at its directive.278 According to the 
CRS website, its current mission is to serve “the Congress 
throughout the legislative process by providing comprehensive and 
reliable legislative research and analysis that are timely, objective, 
authoritative and confidential, thereby contributing to an informed 
national legislature.”279 CRS research covers five broad topics: 
American law; domestic social policy; foreign affairs, defense, and 
trade; government and finance; and resources, science, and 
industry.280 It is possible that the CRS already reviews dismissed 
FTCA cases, but the reports are not available to the public.281 A
publicly available CRS report about the FTCA focused on the broad-
scale effects of judicial doctrines, including the Feres Doctrine, on 
the enforcement of the statute and did not focus in particular on case 
dismissals.282 CRS analysis of dismissed FTCA claims as indicators 
                                                     
275. See Values, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/ 
values.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015) (emphasizing the confidentiality of 
congressional inquiries and communications); see also CRS: Federal Tort Claims 
Act, September 2, 2008, WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS:_Federal_Tort_ 
Claims_Act,_September_2,_2008 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015) (stating that the CRS 
“electronic archives are, as a matter of policy, not made available to the public,” and 
“CRS archives as a whole are firewalled from public access”).
276. See History and Mission, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/ 
about/history.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.  
280. See id.
281. See CRS: Federal Tort Claims Act, September 2, 2008, supra note 275. 
282. See generally HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-717A, 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ISSUES (2001), 
available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/95-
717_A_12032001.pdf; see also HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG.
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of agency performance are well within the statutory mandate and 
would better inform legislative discussion about national problems.  
4. Administrative Conference of the United States 
Finally, the recently rejuvenated Administrative Conference of 
the United States could provide Congress with an important resource 
in improving the procedures that agencies use to investigate, resolve, 
and follow up on federal-tort claims. Congress created the 
Administrative Conference in 1964, with enactment of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and authorized its first appropriations 
four years later.283 The Administrative Conference’s mission is 
defined by statute to “study the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of 
the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies in 
carrying out administrative programs, and make recommendations to 
administrative agencies, collectively or individually, and to the 
President, Congress, or the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
in connection therewith, as it considers appropriate.”284 Although 
defunded in 1995, the Conference was reauthorized in 2008 with the 
enactment of the Regulatory Improvement Act of 2007.285 The 
proposal is consistent with the important work that the 
Administrative Conference carried out during its first three decades 
of work286 and with the recommendation of the Conference’s 
legendary chair Professor Paul Verkuil to undertake “procedural 
audits” to improve agency practices.287 Most important for current 
purposes, the Administrative Conference played a significant role in 
reform of the sovereign immunity doctrine as it applies to 
administrative agencies, and its 1984 report and recommendations on 
“Administrative Handling of Monetary Claims: Tort Claims at the 
                                                                                                               
RESEARCH SERV., 95-717, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-717.pdf. 
283. See History, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/history (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
284. 5 U.S.C. § 594(1) (2012). 
285. For a history, see Gary J. Edles, The Revival of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, 12 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 281 (2011).  
286. See Sally Katzen, Commentary, The Role of the Administrative 
Conference in Improving the Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 650, 656-61 
(1994) (describing the study of alternative dispute resolution, the structure of the 
Resolution Trust Corporation, and the use of civil penalties). 
287. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paul Verkuil’s Projects for the Administrative 
Conference of the U.S. 1974-1992, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2421, 2433 (2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Agency Level” remains a model for immediate improvement.288 The 
Conference is uniquely placed to understand the impact of procedure 
upon government responsiveness and public accountability,289 and its 
involvement in federal-tort oversight would ensure that the process is 
rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan; under its watch, learning could 
be shared across agencies so that mistakes are not repeated.290
C. Back to the Future: Judicially Barred Federal-Tort Claims and 
Private Bills  
Finally, I suggest reinvigorating a claimant’s right to petition 
for a private bill whenever a claim is not cognizable under the 
FTCA—a result that is not foreclosed by the current statute but the 
practice is virtually dormant.291 The FTCA bans Congress from 
considering a private bill for a claim that is cognizable under the 
act.292 To that end, the enactment of the FTCA in 1946 oversaw the 
effective dismantlement of the House Claims Committee and the 
Senate Claims Committee, and the transfer of those duties to the 
                                                     
288. See Bermann, supra note 31, at 509 n.* (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Administrative Settlement of Tort and Other Monetary Claims 
Against the Government (Recommendation No. 84-7), 49 Fed. Reg. 49,837, 49,840 
(Dec. 24, 1984) (codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.84-7). 
289. See Carl McGowan, The Administrative Conference: Guardian and 
Guide of the Regulatory Process, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 67, 71-75 (1984) 
(discussing the Conference’s work in this area); see also David C. Vladeck, 
Commentary, The Administrative Conference’s Role in Promoting Government 
Efficiency Today, Tomorrow, and Next Year, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 697, 699 (1994) 
(discussing the Conference’s ability to deal with the “nuts and bolts” of regulatory 
reform). But cf. Jeffrey D. Koelemay, Judges: Administrative Conference Has Role 
to Foster Communication Among Branches, 83 U.S. L. WK. (BNA) No. 15, at 597 
(Oct. 21, 2014) (describing a recommendation made at a panel of the ABA 2014 
Administrative Law Conference that the Administrative Conference take action to 
“facilitate better communication across rulemaking agencies”).
290. See Alan W. Heifetz, Commentary, The Continuing Need for the 
Administrative Conference: Fairness, Adequacy, and Efficiency in the 
Administrative Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 703, 704 (1994) (urging 
reauthorization of the Administrative Conference as “a forum in which ideas and 
experiences may be shared, to the end that departments and agencies across the wide 
federal government spectrum may learn how best to improve their practices” so that 
“the mistakes of others” are not repeated).
291. See Bermann, supra note 31, at 523-24 (acknowledging that “what 
constitutes a cognizable claim under the FTCA is ambiguous,” but urging a 
definition of “a tort claim arising out of acts within the scope of office and also not 
falling within any of the FTCA exemptions”); see also The Federal Tort Claims Act,
supra note 24, at 550-51.  
292. See Gottlieb, supra note 108, at 4. 
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House and Senate Judiciary Committees, respectively.293 The 
governing principle, however, is that Congress remains politically 
accountable for government misconduct even when a claimed injury 
is beyond the court’s power because immunity is not waived.294 The 
request for a private bill is initiated by the individual seeking relief.295
In order to operationalize the proposal, Congress, or the courts or the 
agencies, or some combination of actors, would need to undertake 
outreach so affected constituents know about this pathway to relief.  
Recommending a return to private bills—given the scandals 
associated with the practice, a loss of faith in a shared notion of the 
public interest, and the state of congressional dysfunction—may 
raise more than a few eyebrows. As a formal matter, a private bill is 
a statute passed for the explicit benefit of a specific individual.296 It is 
                                                     
293. See id. at 4-6 & nn.8-10 (summarizing and setting forth the relevant 
provisions of the 1946 act). 
294. In other contexts, a private bill may be enacted as “protection against 
the rigor of federal statutes or against harmful administrative actions or inactions.” 
Peter H. Shuck & Martha Joynt Kumar, Private Bills: The Gravy Road, in PETER H.
SHUCK, THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEES 242, 243 (1975). However, Congress is more likely to enact 
private legislation “when no other remedy is available, and when enactment would, 
in a broad sense, afford equity.” RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-628,
PRIVATE BILLS: PROCEDURE IN THE HOUSE 1 (2004). See generally WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 249 n.2 (1988) (“The U.S. 
Constitution has no general prohibition or limitation on special legislation. [Note, 
however, that the ban on bills of attainder is a prohibition of one form of special 
legislation.] During each Congress various ‘private bills’ are enacted; one common 
type consists of a waiver of immigration requirements for particular individuals, and 
another common type allows compensation to persons whose claims against the 
federal government fall outside the scope of the Federal Tort[] Claims Act and other 
claims statutes. Although, theoretically, federal legislation that is special in character 
might violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, we know of no case so holding.”).
295. BETH, supra note 294, at 1. 
296. See 145 CONG. REC. 7199 (1999) (extension of remarks by Hon. F. 
James Sensenbrenner, Jr.) (“Private bills deal with specific individuals, corporations, 
institutions, and so forth, as distinguished from public bills which deal with classes 
only.”); ROBERT W. COREN ET AL., GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES: 1789-1989, at 249 (bicentennial ed. 1989) (“A 
private bill, in legislative terminology, is a bill to grant a pension, authorize payment 
of a claim, or grant another form of relief to a private individual, as opposed to 
public bills of general application or that apply to a class of persons.”). A private bill 
differs from a private member bill, which refers to a bill proposed by a member of 
parliament who is not a member of the government’s cabinet. See Scott Proudfoot, 
Private Member Bills Get a Little More Important, HILLWATCH,
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not to be confused with a public law that purports to be general and 
collective, but benefits only a single corporation or an unidentified 
individual.297 Their scope is far ranging.298 In the twentieth century, 
Congress enacted private bills on such matters as to “authorize[e] 
reimbursement to the family of a CIA agent who died while testing 
LSD for the agency, waiving immigration requirements so a 
Philadelphia woman could marry a Greek man, and granting 
citizenship to a 111-year-old Albanian woman so she could vote in 
one free election before she died.”299 These bills embrace an
unfamiliar aspect of legislative power—that of legislative equity, or 
the power of a non-judicial body to afford relief to an individual who 
has no remedy at law.300 Historically, ordinary people used the 
technology of private bills to express grievances and to seek political 
change,301 and the practice played an important role in encouraging 
                                                                                                               
http://www.hillwatch.com/Publications/Bulletins/Private_Members_Bills_More_Im
portant.aspx (last visited Jan. 26, 2015) (defining a private member bill). 
297. The federal tax code, for example, is littered with so-called general 
provisions that nevertheless apply to only a single taxpayer. See, e.g., William L. 
Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code: A Requiem in Honor of the 
Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 HARV. L. REV. 745, 747-48 (1955) 
(discussing the “‘Mayer Provision,’” which afforded tax treatment for one movie 
mogul); Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the J. Comm. on the Economic Report, 84th Cong. 
234-38 (1955) (statements of Walter Blum & William L. Cary) (referring to a 
“fiction of uniformity” in the tax code despite a “patchwork of special provisions” 
that afford “preferences to particular kinds of taxpayers, to certain types of 
receipts[,] to some categories of business expenses, to certain forms of personal 
consumption, and even to particular kinds of savings,” and questioning the propriety 
of according “privileged tax treatment . . . to specific individuals . . . whose only 
common characteristic is access to Congress”). 
298. See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private 
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1893-1902 (2010) (discussing private bills in the context of 
admiralty torts). 
299. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS 117 (3d ed. 1989). 
300. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND 
CLAIMS, 107TH CONG., RULES OF PROCEDURE AND STATEMENT OF POLICY FOR 
PRIVATE IMMIGRATION BILLS 3 (2002); see BETH, supra note 294, at 1 (commenting 
that the legislature enacts private bills in the spirit of equity). As one court of 
appeals explains, the purpose of private legislation, “unlike litigation, is to afford 
relief to persons whose claims would fail under existing law.” Gonzalez Batoon v. 
I.N.S., 791 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1986).  
301. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition 
Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 153 (1986) 
(explaining that through the technology of petitions and private bills, “unrepresented
groups—notably women, felons, Indians, and, in some cases, slaves—represented 
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reform even when the efforts failed—most notably, the petition 
campaign of abolitionists to secure private bills of manumission.302 In 
effect, the mechanism of petition that accompanied the request for a 
private bill allowed “the people” to participate in the production of 
law as creators and actors, and not simply as consumers or 
observers.303 Recovering the right to petition for a private bill when 
tort claims are outside the government’s grant of sovereign immunity 
would serve a compensatory function by rejecting retreatism as an 
acceptable legislative response; as important, it could enrich public 
accountability by encouraging a more robust sense of political 
responsibility.  
CONCLUSION
The  topic of judicially barred federal-tort suits might be seen as 
yet another example of the distinction between “law on the books”
                                                                                                               
themselves and voiced grievances” (footnotes omitted)). Angelina Grimke, in her 
famous public statements about slavery, referred to the right of petition as “the only 
political right that women have,” without which “they are mere slaves, known only 
through their masters.” A. E. GRIMKE, Letter XI: The Sphere of Woman and Man as 
Moral Beings the Same, in LETTERS TO CATHERINE E. BEECHER, IN REPLY TO AN 
ESSAY ON SLAVERY AND ABOLITIONISM, ADDRESSED TO A. E. GRIMKE 103, 112-13
(1838). 
302. See 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS 
AT BAY 1776-1854, at 287, 308 (1990) (referring to the “Gag Rule Controversy,” 
when Congress refused to accept petitions referring to abolition); Higginson, supra
note 301, at 143-44 (reporting that Congress “adopted a series of anti-slavery ‘gag 
rules’ that effectively abolished the right of petition”). Quakers presented a petition 
asking for congressional action to stop the slave trade as early as 1790 at the First 
Congress. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in 
the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 792 (1994). See generally 2
H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 235-51 (John J. Lalor trans., Callaghan & Co. 1888); SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS,
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION 326-51 (1956); WILLIAM LEE MILLER,
ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
144 (1996). 
303. Private bills today make up a small percentage of legislative activity; at 
the turn of the twentieth century, the number of private bills exceeded that of public 
legislation. Charles E. Schamel, Untapped Resources: Private Claims and Private 
Legislation in the Records of the U.S. Congress, PROLOGUE MAG. (Spring 1995), 
http://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1995/spring/private-claims-1.html. 
“During the 101st Congress (1989-1991)[,]” Congress enacted sixteen private bills, 
accounting for less than 3% of all legislative activity. Id. By contrast, “[d]uring the 
[59th] Congress (1905-1907)[,]” Congress enacted 6,249 private bills, accounting 
for 90% of all legislative activity. Id.
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and “law on the ground,”304 highlighting the gap that exists between 
the FTCA’s goals and its implementation through the courts. The 
phenomenon of compliance slack is well documented in the law,305 as 
is the role of procedure in blocking access to judicial relief.306 But the 
very nature of the FTCA, and its aim of lifting the veil of sovereign 
immunity, makes the topic still broader, drawing to the surface what 
Robert M. Cover called the “force of interpretive commitments” that 
hold together a “normative universe.”307 Judicially barred suits—
claims by widows whose veteran-spouses commit suicide or 
servicemembers who withstand sexual abuse in defending our 
country—ought not to be pushed out of view as small and 
insignificant issues. The FTCA can be read to constitute a narrow 
legalist approach to public accountability that celebrates 
extinguishing relief on technical and unfair grounds, or it can 
encourage a richer sense of official responsibility among elected 
representatives who are entrusted by the Constitution for lawmaking 
and governance. In that spirit, this Article has urged that Congress 
consider the true lessons of judicially barred FTCA lawsuits as 
motivation for meaningful oversight and necessary reform. 
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of “‘organizational slack’”). 
306. See Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? 
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587, 598-99 (2011). 
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